The History of Insurance: Risk, Uncertainty and Entrepreneurship by Masci, Pietro
The History of Insurance: Risk, Uncertainty and Entrepreneurship 
  The History of Insurance: Risk, Uncertainty and Entrepreneurship 
Pietro Masci 
University of Rome 
 
1. Introduction 
  The goals of presenting a short review of the history of insurance are to provide a 
historical perspective on this industry; explain how it has developed with an emphasis on its 
recent history; and show the relationship between insurance – pooling and transfer of risks- and 
entrepreneurship - broadly defined as the capability to introduce new combinations of productive 
factors. 
  The analysis offered here is based on the distinction between risk and uncertainty as 
indicated by Knight (2002, or.pub.1921) arguing that risk involves situations where a decision 
maker  face unknown outcomes but known ex-ante probability distributions, while uncertainty is 
characterized by situations in which the probability distribution of a random outcome is 
unknown. Consequently, while risk can be covered by insurance, uncertainty normally is not.  
  Against this background, the history of insurance focuses on the development of 
insurance in developed and emerging markets with a particular attention to Latin America. The 
historical review is instrumental to investigate on two main aspects: whether insurance and 
entrepreneurship interact; and whether the widespread availability of insurance leads to a 
reduction of uncertainty and support the deployment of entrepreneurship.  
  The considerations related to these two aspects constitute the basis to further study and 
test if the development of insurance markets supports economic activity and entrepreneurship 
and in turn contributes to increases in economic growth as measured by the domestic product per 
capita. Following this logic, the research questions that need to be empirically tested and 
answered are: Do insurance markets favor entrepreneurship? And what is the direction of 
causality, e.g., which comes first, insurance or entrepreneurship? 
  The framework of this analysis follows the view that the emergence of market institutions 
such as insurance derives as an unintended consequence from a human activity such as 
entrepreneurship (see High 2009, 5). Further, following Boettke and Coyne (2003), I consider 
whether insurance markets lead to productive entrepreneurship and economic growth.  
  The history of insurance outlined here draws heavily on the work of Manes (1942) and 
Pearson (1997a, 1997b, 2004) and on documentation that Jenkins and Yoneyama (2000) present 
in their eight-volume study.  It also refers to and draws from, among others, Franklin (2001), 
Bernstein (1998), Trenerry (1926), de Roover (1945), Ferguson (2009), Prudential Insurance 
Company of America (1915, reprinted 2009) and finally Klein (1995) for the role of regulation in 
the insurance business.  
  The general economic history of emerging markets, particularly those of Latin America, 
is vast. Bulmer-Thomas (2003) covers the economic history of Latin America from the period 
when its nations achieved independence in the 1820s to the present; stresses the differences 
among the Latin American countries while also recognizing external influences to which they 
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have been subject. In this respect, political, social, cultural and economic development in Latin 
America is influenced by the Spanish and Portuguese systems, which in turn were influenced by 
French law, and by the North America system, particularly in the 20th century. 
  Various contributions provide the background for understanding economic growth, and 
the development of reforms and institutions in Latin America. Haber (2000) reviews historical 
cases of institutional change and economic growth in Latin America in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Other relevant work includes that of Kuczynski and Williamson (2003) 
about the nature of the economic policy agenda that the region should be pursuing after the better 
part of a decade - the 1990s - was punctuated by crises, and during which it achieved 
disappointingly slow growth with no improvement in its highly skewed income distribution and 
in living standards. Teichman (2000) examines the politics of market reform in Chile, Argentina, 
and Mexico, analyzing the implications for democratic practices in each case. Gwynne and Kay 
(2004) explain Latin America’s economic, political, social, and cultural transformations; their 
associations with globalization and the search for modernity; and how these transformations are 
affecting the people of the region. Arias (2011 2-6) spells out cultural obstacles to the 
development of Latin American countries.  
  While the Spanish and Portuguese influence was more systemic, one can find a British 
influence in the development of insurance markets in Latin American countries (Jones 1984) and 
obviously in Caribbean countries. However, insurance topics have not been fully tackled 
(Baughman 1965); in particular, little academic work has been done on the development of the 
insurance industry in Latin America with some notable exception, e.g., Consorte (2005), who has 
written an important history of insurance in Mexico since 1789; Jones (1984) who writes of the 
development of fire insurance in Argentina and the role of British insurers. Relatively more 
expanded is the development of social insurance programs, see Mendelsohn (1954), and Mesa-
Lago (1978) for which there is also a strong influence of Spain and also of the fascist ideology 
(Paxton 2004).   
  A number of studies, mostly from practitioners, have been undertaken to provide a Latin 
American historical perspective on entrepreneurship (e.g., Tiffin 2004).   
  Jara and others (2009), Porzecanski (2009), and Rojas-Suarez (2010) show that the 
impact of the global crisis on Latin America has in some respects been less severe than in 
previous crises. This reflects in part the development of domestic financial markets and 
particularly bond markets, which has provided incentive to retain local savings and attract 
external financial inflows.   
  The findings and considerations on insurance derive from the Western experience with 
reference to the specificities of Latin American countries. In this respect, it is safe to state that 
throughout the centuries, three countries have shaped the development of insurance, i.e., Italy in 
the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance; United Kingdom in the 16th through the 19th century 
and then the United States. The historical review shows to a great extent that insurance is 
connected to entrepreneurship and how individuals imbued with the spirit of innovation and 
entrepreneurship have tried to overcome uncertainty and in the process have shaped the 
development of insurance, financial sector and financial intermediation. These findings 
constitute the background to test the research question, i.e., do insurance markets favor 
entrepreneurship? And what is the direction of causality, e.g., which comes first, insurance or 
entrepreneurship? 
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        This section covers the stages of the history of insurance including the role of insurance 
in the global financial crisis 2007–8; presents several considerations stemming from the 
historical review with respect to the factors and motivations for the development of insurance; 
articulates the relationships among insurance, economic growth, and entrepreneurship, the 
importance of insurance as an institution, the specificities of Latin American countries and the 
role of public policy. 
 
2. The Stages of the Development of Insurance  
  The history of insurance has developed in parallel with that of entrepreneurship to 
conquer uncertainty and it is part of a continuous journey into the so called KuU (Known, 
unknown and Unknowable, see Diebold, Doherty, Herring 2010, 18). The history of insurance 
can be divided into seven periods.  
  The first period, a sort of prehistory of insurance, stretched from ancient times until the 
fourteenth century (i.e., toward the end of the medieval period), and was characterized by various 
primitive forms of protection against uncertainty. The second period lasted from the middle of 
the fourteenth century until the end of the seventeenth century and was marked by the birth of 
the insurance policy. The third period, which included the eighteenth century and first half of the 
nineteenth century, saw the expansion of the forms of insurance and the emergence of insurance 
companies to better support economic activity. The fourth period was highlighted by the 
development of professional financial management, the establishment of the first insurance 
groups, and the beginning of government intervention in the form of social insurance. The fifth 
period - between World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) - was an era of business 
combinations and mergers in any business field. The sixth period - from the end of World War II 
until the end of the twentieth century - witnessed growing importance of regulation and 
supervision; greater intervention of government with social insurance programs; innovations in 
the last two decades of the twentieth century following a revival of the private sector’s doctrines 
and the downfall of the welfare state; increased globalization of financial services; expansion of 
the insurance of new risks; better access to financial services for the lower-income segments of 
the population; and closer relationships between insurance, banking, and capital markets. This 
period consolidated insurance as a crucial market institution.          Finally, at the turn of the 
century, the beginning of the seventh and current period saw the terrorist attacks on the United 
States on September 11, 2001, followed by devastating natural catastrophes (e.g., earthquakes 
and hurricanes) that led to a growing role for government to protect against particular types of 
risks (e.g., terrorism, natural catastrophes).  The 2007–8 global financial crisis deserves 
particular attention because it gives evidence of the limits of rational expectations, Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH) and risk-modeling techniques, not able to fully define the risk profiles 
of events as well as human and social behavior and thus convert uncertainty into risk. The crisis 
confirms the essentiality of effective financial and insurance markets to allow economic actors to 
operate. The crisis also underscores how incorrect construction of risk profiles, shortcomings of 
regulation and supervision, and situations of uncertainty not transformed into risk (e.g., human 
and social behavior, terrorism, catastrophes) may stop the functioning of financial and insurance 
markets, reduce productive activity and lead to more direct or indirect intervention by 
government in the financial and insurance markets.  
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I. The Prehistory of Insurance: Origins and Early Development 
  The fundamental idea of insurance is very ancient, and it is connected with economic 
activities and initiatives and the need to control uncertainty, which must have been much more 
pressing in the past than it is today. As Ferguson (2009, 185) indicates, pre-modern agricultural 
societies relied much more than later ones on efforts to propitiate the gods (or God), who were 
thought to determine famine, plagues, and invasions and explain uncertainties. 
  The first known records of insurance date from several thousand years before the 
Common (or Christian) Era. Chinese merchants (i.e., the entrepreneurs of that time) devised a 
system to protect themselves from losses of shipped cargo resulting from storms, pirates, or 
anything else that could go wrong at sea (Vaughan, 1997). They spread their cargoes among 
several ships - a diversification of risk- believing that whatever could sink, or destroy one ship 
on one day would probably not destroy a whole fleet sailing on several days.  
  The roots of insurance can also be traced to Babylon, where traders were encouraged to 
assume the risks of the caravan trade (i.e., transportation risks) through loans that were repaid 
(with interest) only after the goods had arrived safely (Franklin, 2001, 259; Buckham, Wahl and 
Rose, 2010, 2). We find a record of a mutual association for sharing risks from the time of the 
Babylonian king Hammurabi (ca. 2250 B.C.). This practice, known as bottomry, was given legal 
force in the Code of Hammurabi (ca. 2100 B.C.), which contains the most definite early evidence 
of a type of insurance (Van Niekerk 2009).  According to the Code of Hammurabi, bottomry, in 
its simplest form, entailed a loan made by A to B on the security of B’s ship (i.e., the bottom of 
the ship) on the condition that if the voyage was completed successfully, B would repay the loan 
with a premium at a rate stipulated in the contract; but if the ship was lost, A would forfeit both 
the loan and the premium and would be left with the empty bottom of the ship. The premium 
charged by A had to be sufficient not merely to cover the estimated risk of loss but also to 
provide interest on the money advanced. Bottomry was dealing with events for which a 
probability of occurrence was difficult to identify and quantify.  A bottomry would be taken, but 
the repayment would be contingent on the ship successfully completing the voyage without 
being stolen or lost. With bottomry, people who traveled in caravans organized themselves for 
mutual assistance against looting and pillaging, and they agreed that all would jointly cover the 
losses of each one. Merchants contribute a fraction of their wealth to the risk capital (equity) of a 
venture. If the ship went down, the loan would be spread among a number of investors, which 
constituted a form of risk diversification. The important feature of bottomry is the bundle of loan 
and insurance, i.e., the so called maritime loan so that bottomry cannot be considered a 
standalone insurance contract. The bundle of insurance and loan, typical of the maritime loan, 
does not contribute to diversification as peril risk (loss of the ship), market risk and business risk 
require a great deal of managerial attention from investors and lenders. At the same time, 
borrowers could insure their venture only in combination with a loan. This ancient instrument 
shows the links between finance and insurance, i.e., bundling of  insurance with loan, which 
constitutes nowadays a recurrent theme in insurance contracts and particularly in micro 
insurance, e.g., micro insurance is often sold to low segments of population together with loans 
and this circumstance is not fully understood and accepted. Similar but more sophisticated 
varieties of bottomry still exist, e.g., the so-called cat bonds for natural disasters, for which the 
amount of the loan would be lost in case of the occurrence of the event of natural disaster and the 
probability whose occurrence is not well quantified. 
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  Along with Babylon, early forms of insurance are found in various other ancient 
civilizations. The Phoenicians applied a comparable system of bottomry to their seaborne 
commerce. In old Egypt, legacies for survivors (often inspired by religious motives) were 
organized on a cooperative basis. In Greece, owners of slaves insured against their departure in 
such a manner that they made periodic payments to a particular wealthy man, who in turn 
undertook to pay a certain lump sum if the contingency actually arose.  
Codified Roman law gave no recognition of insurance as separate from a loan, i.e., maritime 
loan. However, contingencies arising from death were provided for as far back as two thousand 
years ago. In fact , Romans used burial societies as a form of life insurance that provided funeral 
expenses for members and payments to the survivors with each member paying an admission fee 
and monthly premiums, and the society insured that each would have a decent burial (Pearce, 
Millett and Struck 2000; Buckham, Wahl and Rose 2010, 4-5).  
  Already in early times, individuals, - merchants and traders, who could be regarded as 
entrepreneurs - introduced various devices to protect themselves against the uncertainties that 
might prevent them from deploying and effectively implementing their initiatives. However, in 
ancient times an insurance contract does not exist. Also the coverage provided was not based on 
a complete knowledge and quantification of probabilities of occurrence of the events. Despite 
these shortcomings, the conceptual apparatus existed to define what insurance is and make it 
operational (Franklin 2001, 273).  
 
II. The Birth of the Insurance Policy 
  In primitive social structures, the enlarged family was the natural place to reduce 
uncertainty and to build risk-sharing association. In the Middle Ages, this risk-sharing role was 
taken by the guild, which rose to such importance that it impressed its stamp upon every 
manifestation of medieval life.  
  With the growth of towns and trade in Europe, the medieval guilds, initially were formed 
as confraternities of workers, undertook to protect their members from loss by fire and 
shipwreck, to ransom them from captivity by pirates, and to provide decent support or burial in 
sickness, poverty, or death. The guild played a lasting and important part in the evolution of 
insurance, inasmuch as it was not an association based upon consanguinity but a brotherhood 
born from the need for mutual assistance among members practicing the same craft or trade, e.g., 
membership was defined by some verifiable characteristic such as birth (Dasgupta 2010). For 
instance, old Anglo-Saxon and Danish guilds in the tenth and eleventh centuries provided that 
losses suffered by a brother from shipwreck, fire, water, or the theft or burglary of cattle were to 
be compensated for jointly by the whole organization. Regular contributions were made for this 
purpose. Gradually, it became customary to include “social welfare” provisions for the benefit of 
the members, e.g., by operating a burial fund.  
 Proximity among members was one of the features of the guilds. Proximity allowed 
individuals to know one another’s characteristics and dispositions as well. Therefore, there was 
little problem of adverse selection (i.e., when people who are bad risks are not distinguishable 
from the good risks). Proximity also allowed people to observe one another, and so they could 
see what they were about, and consequently moral hazard (i.e., the possibility that a party 
insulated from risk may behave differently than it would behave if it were fully exposed to the 
risks) was not a very significant problem. Similar forms of association (i.e., types of so-called of 
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mutual insurance, which reduce or eliminate adverse selection and moral hazard) are found today 
in micro insurance coverage, for instance among people living in the poor areas of big cities 
mostly of emerging market countries. In those areas, people pay premiums jointly and receive 
indemnities related to micro insurance coverage in favor of a group of people living in the area.  
  In the Middle Ages, Italy was the place where several forms of insurance developed, all 
directed to facilitate economic activity. The first authenticated record of a real marine insurance 
transaction - an insurance contract - dates from 1347 and is kept at the Genoa Records Office. 
Specimens of early insurance policies date from 1384 in Pisa and 1397 in Florence. A typical 
contract, such as that with the merchant Francesco Datini (ca. 1355–1410), stipulated that the 
insurers agreed to assume the “risks of god, of the sea, of men of war, of fire, of jettison, of 
detainment, by princes, by cities or by any other person, of reprisal, of arrest of whatever loss, 
peril, misfortune, impediment or sinister that might occur with the exception of packing and 
customs, until the insured goods were safely unloaded at their destination” (de Roover 1945, 
188f; Franklin 2001). Worthy of note is a form of burglary insurance that existed in the early 
Middle Ages as a result of a decree by Pope Gregory IX in 1170. It operated on a limited scale, 
being confined to the small district of Rodez in southern France, where it survived until 1789 
(Manes 1942). These contracts – and particularly the first contract stipulated in Genoa- are 
relevant in that we see a separation of insurance contracts from financing, i.e., insurance policies 
are not bundled with loans, or other kinds of contracts as it happens with bottomry.  
  By the middle of the fourteenth century, marine insurance was practically universal 
among the maritime nations of Europe (Winter 2010). Marine insurance was the mother not only 
of many other branches of insurance but also of insurance law, i.e., the concept of indemnity first 
developed in relation to sea risks. The first statutes for marine insurance originated in Barcelona 
in 1435. In 1549, Emperor Charles V - the Holy Roman emperor - included provisions for 
compulsory marine insurance. Italy and Spain led in marine insurance law in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, while in the countries of Northern Europe, marine insurance took root in the 
age of the great discoveries and the beginning of overseas trade. Accordingly, the initiative for 
insurance activities and legislation passed from Italy and Spain first to the Netherlands, then to 
France and to England in the seventeenth century, and finally to Germany and the United States 
in the nineteenth century. 
  All these various forms of insurance agreements were considered legal as the Middle 
Ages recognized the role of insurance (Brenner, 1996).  However, toward the close of the Middle 
Ages, due to influences of religion (Franklin 2001, 240), legislation against gambling of all kinds 
became more severe, which gave rise to the tendency to consider every insurance deal a gamble. 
The general attitude about this was so strong that all forms of insurance began to be considered 
null and void unless the insured has the object of the insurance, which is a real, insurable interest. 
The rule of the insurable interest, in effect, constituted the beginning of the modern insurance 
policy. To underscore the importance of this rule, which still holds true, refer to the credit default 
swaps, substantially insurance contracts, which were at the center of the financial and economic 
crisis of 2007-8. They are against the long-standing rule of the insurable interest that prohibits 
disinterested parties from taking a policy. In facts, speculators, short sellers, or anyone could buy 
highly leveraged credit derivatives and credit default swaps and lead to a destruction of a 
company, while regulators and supervisors were not able to understand and supervise, or at least 
oversee the instruments of credit default swaps and credit derivatives (Lowenstein, 2010, p.158-
9) 
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  Modern scholars have examined the early development of insurance. Bernstein (1998, 
95) notes that the profit on an investment in goods that must be shipped over a long distance 
depends on many factors and forecasting was a necessity for the insurer (e.g., using statistic and 
mathematical models to assess probabilities). However, history shows that the introduction and 
implementation of insurance policies do not wait for a mathematical and statistical model and an 
available and tested theory (Buckham, Wahl and Rose 2010, 5). Franklin (2003) argues that 
humans have coped with uncertainty without the benefits of advice of mathematicians before 
(and after) Pascal’s discovery of the law of probabilities. Thus, many insurance contracts have 
been introduced without the full backing of statistics, probabilities, policy research, and a full 
quantitative understanding of the risks, but instead relying on the intuitive and practical 
assessment of risk and the operational capability of introducing, adopting, and implementing 
workable and effective instruments - such as insurance policies. This constitutes evidence that 
entrepreneurship also applies with respect to insurance, in the sense of individuals who undertake 
initiatives, e.g., to provide coverage, as they are alert (Kirzner 1985) to grab market opportunities 
for gain (High 2009, 25) and they sell protection against the risks faced by other people 
(Reinmuth and Lewis 1970). In turn, those entrepreneurs face business uncertainty, which is the 
basis of their revenues and possibly profit. 
 
III. The Insurance Companies 
  In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, economic activity and insurance started to 
migrate from the Mediterranean to Northern Europe, where entrepreneurship, innovation, and 
economic activity were flourishing and where entrepreneurs found it relatively easy and cheap to 
obtain financing for a wide range of business projects - from domestic canals to shipbuilding to 
tulip horticulture. In northern Europe a system of support to the economic activities started to 
take shape and insurance companies emerged. 
  Insurance developed rapidly with the growth of Dutch and British commerce in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Martin 2010). The first professional insurers were private 
individuals. Before the formation of corporations devoted solely to the business of writing 
insurance, a number of individuals signed the policies, each of whom wrote his name and the 
amount of risk he was assuming underneath the insurance proposal—hence the term 
“underwriter.” But at an early date, we find instances of insurance pools operated by groups of 
persons, loosely tied together as the emergency arose, like Lloyd’s underwriters in London, or 
permanently united into joint-stock companies or mutual societies. The first life insurance was 
issued in January 1536 to William Gibbons of London, to whom was issued a one-year policy 
that allowed Gibbon’s beneficiaries to obtain 400 pound sterling in the event of death in 
exchange of a premium of 32 pound sterling. It is important to note that the contract was 
underwritten without a clear knowledge of the probabilities, i.e., the mortality tables appeared 
more than 100 years later. Gibbons died and the underwriters had to pay the indemnities in a 
situation where the contract was more a gambling than insurance. 
  British merchants and ship-owners began meeting at a coffeehouse - near the London 
docks - that Edward Lloyd had opened and named Lloyd’s (Brown 1987). They made 
agreements to share both the profits and possible losses of trading trips. Some individuals were 
more willing and had more funds than others to risk possibly hazardous trips. They would assess 
the risk and underwrite such trips. Although insurance was first devised for a ship’s cargo, 
merchants also began to band together to share other kinds of risk, including that of fire. These 
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individuals were the forerunners - again insurance entrepreneurs - of the famous international 
insurance association Lloyd’s of London, whose underwriters today insure almost anything from 
movie stars to the launch of a communications satellite. By the end of the eighteenth century, 
Lloyd’s had grown into one of the first modern insurance companies, and thus an insurance 
market began to develop in London.  
  As the insurance business became increasingly complex, a more organized approach was 
needed. Thus, the first real insurance company was founded in 1667, the year after the Great Fire 
of London destroyed 13,000 homes and left 100,000 people homeless that provided a strong 
impetus for the fire insurance business in England (Pearson 2004). The first joint-stock insurance 
company to offer marine insurance was founded in 1668, with headquarters in Paris, but it was 
short-lived. The first English marine insurance joint-stock company began in 1720. The first life 
insurance companies originated in England toward the middle of the eighteenth century. The last 
third of the eighteenth century witnessed the emergence of livestock insurance, stimulated by the 
development of agriculture.  
  In 1745, two churches in Scotland started the first insurance fund based on actuarial and 
financial principles and calculations of life expectancy rather than mercantile gambling. More 
important, premiums were used to create this fund, which was profitably invested. Therefore, the 
beneficiaries of insurance (e.g., those whom Ferguson calls “widows and orphans”, Ferguson 
2009, 191–95) would be paid out of the return on investments. This is a first example of an 
insurance company that invests savings (i.e., premium received). 
During this period, forms of insurance regulation emerged, e.g., the French Ordonnance marine 
regulation in 1681, which represented the first indirect comprehensive government intervention 
in the field (Manes 1942).  
  In the New World of North America (Wertheimer 2006), the first insurance company was 
founded in Charleston in 1735 as an association of storeowners who shared the risk that fire 
might destroy their wooden buildings  (Cummins and Venard 2007). It lasted only five years. 
Benjamin Franklin founded the Philadelphia Contribution for the Insurance of Houses from Loss 
by Fire in 1752. Fire insurance corporations were formed in New York (1787) and in 
Philadelphia (1794). In 1759, the Presbyterian Synod of Philadelphia sponsored the first life 
insurance corporation in America, for the benefit of Presbyterian ministers and their dependents. 
Similar groups were formed and then split into various companies. Many - such as the Hartford 
Fire Insurance Company, Aetna Life and Casualty Company, and Travelers Insurance Company 
- came to be based in Hartford, giving it the informal title of insurance capital of the United 
States. As these companies grew in both finances and understanding of risk sharing, they began 
to offer more kinds of insurance in more areas of the country. Because underwriters could not 
travel around the country to meet with all the people who might be interested in buying 
insurance, they began appointing agents to offer insurance and accept premium contributions on 
their behalf. This was the birth of the insurance agency system, through which most people in the 
United States today buy their insurance (McCosker 1945). 
  In Latin America, Spain's domination imposed its model in many areas including 
insurance and facilities for commerce, e.g., shipping, warehousing, and communication, see 
Oszlak (1991). Similarly than in Europe, in Latin America, the path of development of the 
insurance starts with the creation of maritime insurance given the activities of companies that 
trade with the European continent. 
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 Insurance as we understand it today started around the mid of the seventeenth century, 
when the theoretical bases for insurance began to be established and provide thoughtful support 
to the underlying realities that led to the development of insurance theory and operations 
(policies). Outstanding individuals made significant contributions to the progress of the theory of 
insurance (Borch 1964, Thoyts 2010). Franklin (2003) and Ferguson (2009, 189–201) stress 
several conceptual breakthroughs particularly with respect to probability.  Blaise Pascal 
represents the turning point in the development of the theory of probability, a concept he 
developed in 1640 working with another mathematician, Fermat, on the Theory of Probability, 
i.e., letters between the two show that Pascal and Fermat participated equally in the creation of 
the theory (Bell 1937, 86). Other key individuals, John Graunt (b. 1620, d. 1674), (Graunt 1975) 
founded the science of demography, the statistical study of human populations. He analyzed vital 
statistics, particularly the compilation of births and deaths in London from 1604 to 1661 that 
would lead to the tables of life expectancy and mortality that are the basis for life insurance. In 
1693, following the work of Graunt, the astronomer Edmond Halley (1656-1742) constructed the 
first mortality tables, based on the statistical laws of mortality and compound interest, (Halley 
1693, 596-610). These tables, corrected in 1756 by Joseph Dodson (1696-1772), made it possible 
to adjust the premium rate for insurance depending on the age of the insured person; previously, 
the rate had been the same for people of all ages. Edward Wigglesworth (Vinovskis, 1971) 
produced the first life expectancy table in the United States and is also regarded as one of the 
founders of actuarial science. Very relevant was the work of Jacob Bernoulli, who first described 
the Law of Large Numbers -one of the foundations of insurance - and then developed a rigorous 
mathematical proof published in Ars Conjectandi (The Art of Conjecturing) in 1713 that 
represents the first treatise on probability. This became generally known as Bernoulli’s Theorem. 
Abraham de Moivre developed the normal distribution (Abraham de Moivre 1733), with De 
Moivre’s chief works: The Doctrine of Chances (1718), the Miscellanea Analytica (1730), in 
which he investigated infinite series, and A Treatise of Annuities on Lives (1752), an application 
of probability to mortality statistics, and the creation of the theory of annuities (Stigler 1986). 
Later Gauss develops the normality curve (Gauss 1809). Daniel Bernoulli (Bernoulli, 1954 
[1738]) articulated the theory of utility, with the St. Petersburg paradox as the base of the 
economic theory of risk aversion, risk premium and utility (Martin 2008).  Thomas Bayes 
(Bayes, 1764, 370-418) puts the basis of inference and further development of statistics. These 
outstanding individuals started a large development of studies and researches that made the 17th 
the century of mathematical and probability discoveries.  
  In this period, key concepts of insurance emerge:  the risk of misfortune to a thing can be 
sold independently from the thing itself; the premium of an insurance policy represents the 
quantification of the risk involved; profit can be made from estimating the risk correctly 
(Franklin 2001, 273-4); the premiums received are invested. 
 
IV. Growth of Activities, Professional Management and Social Insurance  
  In the eighteenth century, a greater individualism was emerging. The pioneers in this 
field—Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727–81) and François Quesnay (1694–1774) - called the 
physiocrats (Muller 1978), in contradiction to the mercantilism of the time, gave a new and 
wider scope to individualism. The disappearance of guilds and similar medieval institutions led 
to a growing economic role for the individual that had been theretofore unknown. In this context, 
the individual’s realization in spite of his or her vulnerability became a powerful driving force, 
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which encouraged individuals to find new forms of protection. The increased insured activities 
prompted the need of a more professional management approach. Towards the end of the 19th 
century, following the economic development related to the industrial revolution, a series of 
social and political problems emerged as a consequence of the greater role that workers play in 
the economy and led to the introduction of social programs. 
 
 i. Growth of Insurance Activities 
  In the eighteenth century, the range of insurance widened. In the 1830s, the practice of 
classifying risks started (Manes 1942). After 1840, with the decline of religious prejudices, life 
insurance entered a boom era. Accident insurance became popular in Europe in 1845; at the 
outset, it was limited to railroad accidents. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Cuthbert 
Heath (1859–1939) is credited with being the father of non-marine insurance at Lloyd’s. He later 
cemented Lloyd’s reputation in the United States by paying all claims resulting from the 1906 
San Francisco earthquake and fire, irrespective of policy wordings. Liability insurance was 
introduced in 1876. Insurance against damages to plate glass and plumbing followed, and 
afterward all the other branches of insurance developed. To the existing insurance policies - 
created to cover the losses caused by the forces of nature, like death and fire - new types of 
coverage were added mainly to protect against losses resulting from the acts of people, like 
burglary and similar crimes. The Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1897 in Britain required 
employers to insure their employees against industrial accidents. Public liability insurance, 
fostered by legislation, made its appearance in the 1880s, and it attained major importance with 
the advent of the automobile. Insurance policies providing for money requirements that resulted 
not from natural calamities, business conditions, or civic duties but solely from acts of human 
volition like negligence (e.g., public liability insurance) represented the last link of this chain.  
  With respect to insurance activities, the “independent” history of insurance in Latin 
America starts in the 19th century. According to Abreu and Fernandes (2010), the history of 
insurance companies in Brazil began in 1808 when two insurance companies were founded in the 
province of Bahia: Companhia de Seguros Boa Fé and Companhia de Seguros Conceito Público. 
However, the development of this business was very slow, due to the lack of economic 
opportunities and political stability and to an institutional framework very negligent and not 
adapted to the specificities of the country given that early legislation on insurance was borrowed 
from Portugal.  
 Towards the end of the 19th century, there was an expansion of insurance in Latin 
America with the opening to foreign companies through the agency system (appointment of local 
agents mostly located in Buenos Aires) rather than that of the branch system: British (e.g., 
London Insurance Corporation and the Lancashire Insurance Corporation), Swiss (Basle 
Insurance) and German (Gladbach Insurance). This was due to the buoyant market of Latin 
America (particularly for commodities and especially in Argentina), and to the trade between 
Latin American countries and Europe, e.g., Argentina was a rising field for British trade and 
investment (Jones 1984). The entry of foreign insurance companies in the Latin American 
market prompted the reaction of local insurance businesses like Estrella in Argentina. In the 
early years of the 20th century, following the independence of almost all the countries, Latin 
American governments started to adopt antagonistic legislation imposing on foreign insurance 
companies various limitations, e.g., buy local securities and put it in deposits inside the country. 
In fact, Estrella was stressing the fact that its funds were invested locally and contributed to the 
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local development. This argument was also against the practice of agency used by foreign 
insurance companies as opposed to the practice of the branch system. This stance was then the 
base for lobbying the Congress in favor of Argentinian based companies (Jones 1984, 117). In 
addition, given the interventionist attitude that was widespread in Latin America, e.g., in the area 
of trade policy and commerce, many Latin American Governments decided to directly control 
insurance companies, e.g., several of them were nationalized. For instance, in 1924 the National 
Insurance Bank was created in Costa Rica as a state monopoly to provide banking and insurance 
services and the public sector monopoly of insurance in Costa Rica that lasted until the early 
2000. In Brazil, the objective of government intervention in the insurance market was to limit the 
adverse balance of payments impact of seeking reinsurance abroad. Decree Law 1186 of April 
1939 gave the monopoly of reinsurance business, the task of redistributing business, which 
exceeded its retention limits, to insurance companies operating in Brazil and the monopoly of the 
placement of reinsurance abroad. Reinsurance with the Institute of Reinsurance (IRB) of risks 
exceeding retention limits was made compulsory and retention tables had to be approved by the 
Departamento Nacional de Seguros Privados e Capitalização-DNSPC. State-controlled social 
security institutes held 70% of IRB´s capital and the residual 30% were held by the insurance 
companies. By the end of the nineteenth century, governments were assuming a greater role in 
the insurance business. This gave birth to what is then defined as social insurance. 
  Concerning the intervention of the state in the economy, it is worth noting that the 
Argentinean state was supposed to be modeled on a liberal track. The constitution of 1854 was 
shaped very much along the lines of that of the United States. However, the political reality 
changed and moved the largest Latin American economies toward state intervention and 
protectionist, which did not help the development of the region (Jones 1984, 120).  
  The growth of insurance activities and the emergence of new needs prompted greater 
professional management and social insurance programs. 
 
 ii. Professional Management Approach 
  The development of the insurance industry required a strong professional management 
from financial and operational points of view, i.e., insurance companies started to be organized 
in a financially sound manner to respond to the needs of a growing economy.  
  From a financial point of view, the New York Fire of 1835 called attention to the need for 
adequate reserves to meet unexpectedly large losses; in 1837, Massachusetts became the first 
state to require companies by law to maintain such reserves. The devastation caused by the Great 
Chicago Fire of 1871 emphasized the costly nature of fires in structurally dense modern cities 
and thus the importance of prevention as well as appropriate reserves.  In the following years, the 
growth of the reinsurance business (Gastel 2004) became a critical factor in the progress of 
insurance. Reinsurance, whereby losses are distributed among many companies, started to 
become common in various lines of insurance and was devised to meet such situations as 
catastrophic fires and floods and expand the availability of insurance (Ericson and Doyle, 2004, 
35-6). 
  From an operational point of view, various forms of association among insurers emerged 
and the transformation of the insurance companies were directed to meet growing needs of 
clients. This leads to the promotion of big insurance trusts, or groups, which are often 
international in character, in all great countries and in special fields of insurance (Manes 1942). 
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In this contest a rationalization of the insurance business takes place under the forms of 
brokerage system and branch-office system, specialization, standardization, and joint-stock 
companies.  
 The system of insurance brokerage firms and agencies - e.g., the canvassing system, born 
in America and also introduced in Latin America by foreign insurance companies (see above) - 
was developing, whereby the insurance agent called from house to house selling insurance.  
The development of the branch-office system is a phenomenon that assumed two forms. The big 
companies (mostly European reinsurance companies) (1) founded one or several branch 
establishments, engaged in straight insurance business; or (2) called into existence a number of 
organizations, different in appearance but tied by personal bonds, for the operation of different 
branches of insurance.  
  In this period, insurance companies moved towards progressive specialization. By 
combining the sales of various products, and through the joint operation of different branches of 
insurance, a considerable reduction of overhead costs was achieved. Along these lines, one notes 
the progressive classification of customers according to their social status, and consequently 
insurance companies specialized in service to certain professional categories. Premium rates and 
other conditions varied from company to company, according to whether they catered to the 
upper classes, big landowners, or traders and professional people. 
  As insurance companies became more professionally managed, they strove to come to a 
standardization regarding, for example, provisions for the level of premiums, e.g., the 
developments in the operation of insurance led to the adoption of periodic premium payments 
(Manes 1942). However, the tendency toward progressive standardization, which was typical of 
big business, was less generally characteristic of insurance.  This limited standardization made it 
very difficult, even for the expert, to compare the prices and services offered by various 
companies, e.g., for accident and health insurance. In some instances, however, the growing 
standardization of needs, and a certain leveling, brought about a greater uniformity in insurance. 
This led to the emergence of insurance companies catering to particular professional categories. 
For example, the members of a certain profession may be expected to have more or less the same 
needs, including their needs for insurance. This deficient standardization in insurance still exists, 
for instance, among the so-called mutuals, cooperatives, and community-based organizations that 
operate in the micro insurance field and try hard to standardize contracts to make their operations 
more efficient.  
  Joint-stock companies began to adopt some of the principles of mutual companies (e.g., 
paying dividends to policyholders, Manes 1942), while the latter strove to incorporate into their 
statutes some of the advantages offered by joint-stock companies (e.g., fixed premiums). In 
many countries, the differences between government insurance funds and private insurance 
companies became less pronounced, inasmuch as the former gradually adopted commercial 
forms of operation (e.g., this was the case for life insurance in Italy). 
 
 iii. Social Insurance 
  Towards the end of the 19th century, the increase of the working class and its rising 
political relevance created uniform needs of protection; hence the introduction of standard social 
insurance programs under the government’s umbrella and the beginning of the so-called welfare 
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state as well as the expansion of insurance plans suitable for the small businessperson. In the 
nineteenth century, many “friendly” and “beneficence” societies were founded to insure the life 
and health of their members, and many fraternal orders were created to provide low-cost, 
members-only insurance, e.g., today, fraternal orders continue to provide insurance coverage, as 
do most labor organizations; many employers sponsor group insurance policies for their 
employees to include life insurance as well as sickness and accident benefits and old-age 
pensions (and the employees usually contribute a certain percentage of the premium).  
  In Germany, the Social Democrat, National Liberal, and Center parties were all involved 
in the early stages of social legislation, but it was Otto von Bismarck, the first chancellor of the 
German Empire, who established the first practical aspects of the welfare state. He implemented 
social legislation to preempt the programs championed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
(Eghigian, 2000). Bismarck’s idea was to introduce the minimum aspects of these programs that 
were acceptable to the German government without any of their overtly socialistic aspects and to 
focus on programs designed to increase productivity, as well as gain the political attention of 
German workers. These initiatives included health insurance, accident insurance (workmen’s 
compensation), disability insurance and old-age retirement pensions. On the basis of Bismarck’s 
message, the Reichstag considered three bills designed to deal with health insurance (1883) and 
accident insurance (1884). Retirement pensions and disability insurance were dealt with later 
(1888). These initiatives were also politically motivated to win voters and were not undertaken 
for altruistic motives (Ferguson 2009, 203). Bismarck’s social insurance legislation set the stage 
for broad state intervention in providing social insurance.  
  The German health insurance program was enacted in 1883 to provide health care for the 
largest segment of the nation’s workers. The health service was established on a local basis, with 
the cost divided between employers and employees. Employers contributed one-third, while 
workers contributed the remaining two-thirds. The minimum payments for medical treatment and 
sick pay for up to 13 weeks were legally fixed. The individual local health bureaus were 
administered by a committee elected by the members of each bureau. This had the unintended 
consequence of establishing a majority representation for the workers, on account of their large 
financial contribution.  
  The Reichstag of the Kingdom of Prussia passed accident insurance legislation in 1884. 
The program’s entire expense was to be underwritten by employers, which also administered the 
program. Accident insurance became effective in the 14th week, to take over where the health 
insurance program left off. It paid for medical expenses and provided a pension of up to two-
thirds of earned wages if the worker had been fully disabled. The program was expanded in 1886 
to include agricultural workers. 
  The Old-Age Retirement Pension Program, enacted in 1888, was financed by a tax on 
workers and designed to provide a pension annuity for workers who reached the age of 70 years. 
At that time, life expectancy for the average Prussian was 45 years. From the start, the program 
covered industrial and agricultural workers as well as artisans and servants. Also, unlike the 
other two programs (health and accident insurance), the principle that the government should 
contribute a portion of the underwriting cost, with the other two portions prorated accordingly, 
was established. The disability insurance program was intended to be used by those who had 
been permanently disabled and was directly supervised by the state or province. 
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  While Germany started the intervention of the government in social legislation, it was 
Japan that created a first-class, vast welfare state (Shibata 2008). 
  The introduction of social programs in Latin America is influenced by the colonial 
Spanish and Portuguese systems, in turn influenced by the French System. On the other hand, 
one can easily find a strong English influence in the development of insurance markets in 
Caribbean counties. One should also note that in turn the Spanish and Portuguese insurance 
systems were heavily influence by the French approach.  
  Cutler and Johnson (2001) intend to explain why countries have adopted national Old-
Age Insurance and Health Insurance programs considering that several theories attached factors 
that could lead to adoption (e.g., strain from expanding capitalism; need for political legitimacy; 
increased wealth; and the outcome of leviathan government). They find weak evidence that these 
theories explain the adoption of Old-Age and Health Insurance and conclude that social 
insurance can be politically expedient for many different reasons. 
  In this phase of development, more clearly than in the past, economic activity and 
insurance business evolve in parallel. The experiences of the 18th and 19th centuries, particularly 
in the United Kingdom, have provided an opportunity for economic historians to examine the 
relations among financial services, insurance, economic activity and growth (Rubinstein 1993; 
Cain and Hopkins 1993; Lee 1986, 1990; Barras 1986, 1990) (see also section on insurance and 
economic growth). Enormous amounts of capital would not be invested without the possibility of 
eliminating at least some of the inherent risks by means of insurance. Therefore, it may well be 
said that large-scale industry, finance capitalism, and insurance have been mutually self-
supporting in their way forward and the availability of insurance policies made investments 
possible. During the nineteenth century, the growth of the leading European insurance 
companies, and even more of American firms, kept pace with the intensive expansion of the 
banking field. Enormous increases in amounts insured, a remarkable growth of capital assets, and 
an expansion of foreign and overseas business were typical of this evolution, especially during 
the last third of the 19th century (for data, Manes 1942, 43).  
  The expansion and the broadening of scope of insurance - the rise of comprehensive 
insurance plans- made possible the growth of large-scale operations in industry and 
transportation. Progressive improvements in communication technology have also greatly 
contributed to the advancement of insurance. In this context, joint-stock companies supplanted 
private insurers, so the individual insurer tended to disappear.  
  However, innovation and creative destruction of the pioneers of entrepreneurship and of 
insurance encountered difficulties and failures (e.g., the first life insurance company founded in 
Central Europe in 1828 was obligated to place its four hundred shares on the international market 
and was further compelled to guarantee its clients a 50 percent participation in the profits, 
computed every seven years). This provides some evidence that it takes time before a practice 
such as insurance becomes largely spread and accepted (High 2009). 
  As insurance became more institutionalized, there was a trade-off between the benefit of 
reducing uncertainty and promoting economic initiatives, and the tendency of people to become 
less active and entrepreneurial and instead rely on the government: “There is nothing to gain by 
idleness. . . . Men must be active persevering and energetic” (Hunt 1853, 775; see also 
Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen, 2001).  I would argue that as uncertainty is increasingly discovered 
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and understood, new forms of uncertainties surface, so that people start to get used to the reality 
that insurance is a market institution that can facilitate business. 
 
V. Combinations and Internationalization 
  The years of hyperinflation, from 1919 to1923, were disastrous for the insurance business 
(Evans 2004), which cannot function properly if the reference currency is not playing its role as a 
standard of value, and a means of conserving value. Monetary devaluations hit both insurer and 
insured not only when the risk actually matures but also both before and after devaluation, and 
thus they have a very detrimental effect upon all kinds of capital accumulation, reserves, etc. 
Despite this negative impact, the effects of World War I on the role of insurance were not 
destructive. In fact, the mortality experience due to the war proved to be less significant than 
most companies had feared (Butt 1984) and the companies offset the losses against the raise of 
income. On the other hand, the war proved to be of propaganda for life, individual, social, and 
disability insurance, and a forceful impetus for marine insurance. In spite of the war’s enormous 
number of causalities, not one life insurance company suspended payments during the war.  
  This situation prompted a series of combinations of insurance companies as well as the 
realization of insurance as a field of research. However, there was hardly another time in the 
history of insurance that was marked by the formation of so many new concerns in Europe as the 
period from 1919 to 1923. In Germany alone, about 250 new companies were established during 
these five years.  
  Horizontal integration through the formation of trusts and mergers of existing or newly 
formed companies, stimulated by the increasing demand for capital and the need to reduce 
overheads, was a main feature of this period. A related development was that of vertical 
integration, such as that of direct insurance with reinsurance, insurance with banking and other 
operations, shipbuilding with marine insurance, information services with credit insurance, 
property protection with burglary insurance, and health services with life insurance (Barr and 
others 2006; Lipton 2006; Bouwens 2007; Cheffins 2007). In most countries, the control of the 
nation’s entire economic machinery was gradually passing into the hands of a few big financiers 
and industrialists, who rose to a level of power and prestige that would have been unthinkable 
under any other economic regime (for instance, the Rothschild businesses included bullion 
brokering and refining, commercial bills, commodity trading, foreign exchange trading and 
arbitrage, insurance, personal banking to wealthy individuals, and rail financing in France, 
Austria, and Germany, see Barr and others 2006). 
  Combinations and mergers were aimed at a rationalization of insurance operations and 
produced: (1) an ever-increasing tendency toward specialization of risks and the parallel gradual 
substitution of the collective experience of insurance companies for individual judgment; (2) a 
corresponding tendency toward integration and the accumulation of several branches of 
insurance within one company; (3) a rising popularity of group policies. In other words, 
insurance continued to undergo in an international context, the same rationalization process as 
other economic activities. 
  Since the late nineteenth century, the government has continued to enter the field of 
insurance, especially with respect to safeguarding workers against sickness and disability (either 
temporary or permanent), destitute old age, and unemployment. This was driven by political 
motivations and with the goal of reducing uncertainty. During World War II, the U.S. 
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government provided life insurance for members of the armed forces; since then, it has also 
begun to provide other forms of insurance, such as pensions for veterans and government 
employees. The U.S. government has also experimented with various types of crop insurance, a 
landmark in this field being the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1938 (Kramer 1983).  
  The progress made in the practice of insurance during the second half of the twentieth 
century was accompanied by advances in studies of insurance. In fact, the insurance business 
becomes increasingly based upon scientific principles and draws from almost every branch of 
technology and science. With members in more than 40 countries, the German Insurance 
Association (Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft) promoted the science of 
insurance since 1900. In one or two decades, the members of this association around the world 
introduced the German system into their own universities. This was also happening in Japan 
(Pearson 1997a and 1997b).  
  The main features of this period were business combinations, mergers, in an effort to 
achieve a greater rationalization and an international dimension, together with the continuous 
growth of insurance companies –particularly after World War I. The rationalization was 
occurring in presence of a greater intervention of Government.  
 
VI. Government Intervention  
  World War I, the Great Depression of the 1920s and 1930s led Government to issue large 
amount of securities that were mostly purchased by insurance companies. The intervention of 
Government in the economy increased and so Government Debt. From World War II through the 
early 1980s, government intervention was pervasive in many fields, following Keynesian 
policies (Pugh and Garratt 1996). Towards the end of the century, the revival of private sector 
doctrines, the fall of communism and globalization opened a new era of opportunities.   
  Government direct intervention took mostly the form of reinsurance and social insurance, 
while indirect intervention involved regulation and supervision.  Direct intervention was more 
characteristic of continental European and emerging market countries, while Anglo-Saxon 
countries preferred to focus on indirect intervention such as regulation and supervision of the 
industry. Governments also intervene through the tax code by providing tax deductions for 
certain types of policies. 
  A particular form of intervention started in Europe (see previous section IV) and was the 
so-called social insurance including pension, which were very popular and increasingly favorable 
for workers particularly in Europe and Latin America. Latin America countries have always been 
inclined to introduce social schemes to protect the poor segments of the population. Those 
schemes were enacted mostly for political reasons following the European models, e.g., Spain, 
Portugal, France and Italy (e.g., particularly the influence of fascism, Paxton, 2004) without 
considering the economic and financial impacts in a region vulnerable to economic and financial 
crises. Examples of social insurance programs introduced in Latin American countries: 
compulsory maternity insurance to provide an income throughout the confinement period of 
working mothers and regulating night and hazardous work was in effect by the 1950s in the 
majority of the Latin American countries. Throughout the period 1920-1970, the intervention of 
Latin American governments in the economy followed the policy recommendations of CEPAL - 
Comisión Económica para América Latina - with programs of import substitution and public 
welfare (Reid 2007, 118-120).  Government intervention was motivated by the attempt to speed 
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industrialization, and also by populism, and reached their peak and extreme forms in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  Protectionism, heavy government’s interventions and the dependence on foreign 
savings as well as the export sector, made the region always very volatile, i.e., a crisis-prone 
region with the poor suffer significantly more during crises (Braun and di Gresia 2003).  
  It should be pointed out that the political theory of the state and the role of government in 
Latin America derived from the view of colonial countries, i.e., Spain and Portugal and 
Continental Europe in general, which regarded government as a good, natural and necessary for 
the welfare of society (Wiarda and Kline 2011, 59-61). This is in contrast with the Anglo-Saxon 
and American view that Government is a necessary evil and should be limited. 
  In the early 1980s, the private sector doctrines of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
led to a progressive dismantling of Government intervention (Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby 1999; 
Giddens 1998, 116; Cerny 2008) and thus of the welfare state and the creation of private 
alternatives that provided a new basis for the engaging capitalist society (Ericson and Doyle 
2003, 6-7), together with growing capital markets. These policies initiated in Great Britain and in 
the United States and then introduced in other countries, including emerging countries. In 
financial markets, the 1980s witnessed a theoretical revolution (e.g., Markowitz 1959; Sharpe 
1964; Litner 1965; Fama 1965) that spurred liberalization, deregulation, and free markets 
(Cassidy 2010, 86). Rational expectations and efficient markets’ theories prompted innovation 
and the development of capabilities for modeling risk according to sophisticated mathematical 
models, under the assumption of a functioning market discipline and taking advantage of the 
tremendous improvements in computational technology. 
  Following the devastating financial and economic crises of the 1980s, the doctrines of 
privatization hit Latin America countries in the 1990s. Thus to restore credibility for the “lost 
decade” of the financial debt crisis of the 1980s, Governments in the region became the 
frontrunners in the privatization and liberalization programs and in the introduction of schemes 
of pension based on personal contributions and with reduced cost for the Government. 
  After World War II, many insurance firms expanded, mergers continued to occur, and 
multiple-line companies dominated the field. In 1999, the U.S. Congress repealed banking laws 
that had prohibited commercial banks from entering the insurance business, also considering that 
these restricted practices did not exist in other industrial countries.  
  The expansion of insurance products and the significant increase in the frequency and 
scale of insurer failures in the later 1980s (Grace and others 2003) raised serious concerns about 
the adequacy of regulatory oversight. The industry’s cost pressures, greater financial risk, and 
expanding geographic scope forced governments to revamp their regulatory frameworks.   These 
efforts are undertaken in a global context, with the setting of internationally accepted standards -
including strengthening financial standards, expanding financial reporting, improving monitoring 
and auditing tools, accrediting insurance departments, modernizing governance, increasing 
transparency, and streamlining market regulation. 
  The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) - established in 1994 and 
representing insurance regulators and supervisors in some 190 jurisdictions in nearly 140 
countries, and thus constituting 97 percent of the world’s insurance premiums - intervenes 
globally in the area of insurance supervision dictating international principles. The objectives of 
IAIS are to: 
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• Promote the development of well-regulated insurance markets; 
• Favor improved supervision of the insurance industry on domestic and international 
levels to maintain efficient, fair, safe, and stable insurance markets for the benefit and 
protection of policyholders; 
• Contribute to global financial stability. 
 
  At the end of the twenty-first century, insurance activity had increased rapidly in parallel 
with the expansion of the economy; premiums (particularly for liability policies) had augmented 
swiftly around the world, leaving unprecedented numbers of people (e.g., in the United States) 
uninsured (Community 2005). On the other hand, insurance companies face lawsuits that at 
times lead to large monetary awards. The insurance industry, however, remains strong and able 
to provide insurance products for the needs of advanced economies. Numerous direct providers 
of insurance and almost 200 reinsurance companies worldwide attest to the health of the 
industry. Insurance is increasingly part of an interconnected financial sector and of financial 
intermediation; and as liberalization and globalization progress further, they increase innovation 
and competition vis-à-vis large demand—mostly in emerging market countries—that is not 
reached and satisfied.  
 
VII. The Current Period: Risk in Global and Interconnected Markets  
  The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,  natural disasters (e.g., 
Katrina, el Nino) and then the financial crisis of 2007-8 show that the possibility of devastating 
events - provoked by people or by nature - can create new uncertainties and vulnerabilities 
(Ericson and Doyle 2004) for the insurance industry.  
 
 i. Terrorism and Natural Catastrophes  
  The severity of damages from terrorism and natural disasters has found insurers 
reasonably well prepared to manage the events’ financial impact on that large scale. Insurers 
worldwide and the U.S. insurers benefited from favorable market conditions and built up 
surpluses for these unexpected events. Almost all rated insurance companies were able to meet 
their commitments, even though some individual companies’ ratings were lowered, e.g., 
Selective Insurance group of companies (Standard’s and Poor’s Rating Direct September 2009), 
and Government intervention has been instrumental to overcome various problems and 
uncertainty (Barry, Doyle and Ericson 2003; Dixon, Arlington, Carroll, Lakdawalla, Reville and 
Adamson 2004; Ericson and Doyle 2004).  There are unpredictable events that produce high 
losses and cannot be included in a rational model and therefore uncertainty is not converted into 
risk (Kunreuther and Pauly 2010, 235). In this case, there is a market failure and insurance is not 
available. Thus the role of Government is crucial to introduce impose some form of incentives in 
the design of policies and also to operate as the insurer of last resort in case of unpredictable 
events. However, there is also the possibility that Government intervention prompted by 
uncertainty enters areas and activities that belong to the private sector. 
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 ii. The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–8 
  The crisis of 2007 -8 presents many aspects and implications for the financial and 
insurance sectors. 
•     The Financial Crisis 
  Though brewing for a while, the financial crisis started to show its effects in the middle 
of 2007 and into 2008 (when mortgages encouraged by government policies started to face large 
scale defaults and the housing market crumbled) and is still doing so at the time of this writing. 
Around the world, stock markets have fallen, large financial institutions have collapsed or been 
bought out, and governments in even the wealthiest nations have had to come up with rescue 
packages to bail out their financial systems. There are several interpretations about the drivers of 
the crisis. The list is rather long:  monetary policy; excess savings with unbalances in some 
emerging countries; financial innovation; regulation and supervision failure; inability to deal 
with the so called shadow banking, i.e., finance companies that were able to build huge liabilities 
without having the necessary capital and access to central liquidity or public sector guarantees 
(Cassidy 2010, 272-75;Van Overtveltd 2009, 213; Friedman 2011, chapters 4 thru 10)1; new 
forms of corruption difficult to detect; lack of transparency; accounting rules, e.g., mark to 
market that reinforce the pro-ciclicity of various rules of Basel II2.   
  An overall explanation for the current financial crisis is that risk was inappropriately 
modeled following the myth of rational markets and efficient market theories, (Fox 2009). In 
addition, wrong incentives were in place to gain up-front fees and profits and shifting long term 
risk to others. Supervisory authorities have not been able to prevent or repress these practices. 
Once the first defaults appeared and the crisis started, uncertainty about the future became 
widespread. Thus the unraveling of the crisis takes us back to the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty (Skidelsky 2009; Skidelsky and Wigstrom 2010) in line with the insight of Minsky 
(2008, 1992) that uncertainty of cash flows from investments has negative repercussions on 
business. The global financial crisis of 2007–8 has strengthened the view that “the distinction 
between risk and uncertainty helps explain the financial markets from the late summer 2007 
onward.” (Roubini 2010, 94)  The 2007–8 crisis has verified that financially integrated markets 
provided better access to capital and sophisticated models, contributed to risk management and 
economic growth, but they have not been able to assess uncertainty, convert it into risk and 
reduce it (Tonveronachi 2010). 
  Under these circumstances, coordinated government intervention is needed in two 
directions: to provide a stimulus, and to regulate and supervise.  
  The first type of intervention, the stimulus (e.g., unemployment benefits, infrastructure 
financing, lower interest rates) is intended to reduce individuals’ uncertainty and make 
consumers’ and investors’ confidence come back, but open a huge debate on the role of the 
Government and also on the so called exit strategy once the crisis is over . 
                                                 
1 Just to give an order of magnitude, derivatives to insure against loans went from $866 million in 1987 to $454 
trillion in 2007 (Fox, 2009, xii). 
2 Basel II is the second of the Basel Accords, initially introduced in 2004. The accord enacts recommendations on 
banking laws and regulations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The goal of Basel II is to 
establish agreed international standards for the capital banks need to face financial and operational risks. 
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The second type of intervention, better regulation and supervision needed to restore discipline in 
an integrated market (and also to restore confidence and reducing uncertainty) deserve more 
attention. Claessens (2009, 2, 18) indicates that the main lesson to emerge from the crisis is “the 
need to balance regulation with the role of self-governing markets and to establish a sustainable 
and effective financial architecture.” Globally, there is a need for a wider regulatory perimeter 
and greater cooperation. Emerging markets and developing countries still face specific 
challenges in building up their own financial sectors and creating a credible and legitimate 
regulatory environment, and they need a stronger voice in international financial reforms, policy 
decisions, and actions to help overcome these challenges. In addition, a sound regulatory 
environment should favor healthy financial innovation. In fact, new financial theories favored by 
advances in computational science, increased freedom of action and prompted a wave of 
financial innovations - a form of entrepreneurship in financial markets- of the 1980s and 1990s 
(Allen and Yago 2010). Financial innovation plays a key role not only in improving the 
functioning of financial markets but also facilitating the global financial crisis of 2007–8, i.e., 
U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke acknowledged the role of financial innovation, in 
that financial “innovation that is inappropriately implemented can be positively harmful.” He 
later added “the difficulty of managing financial innovation in the period leading up to the crisis 
was underestimated” (Bernanke 2009).  Therefore, regulation and supervision play a crucial role. 
The Chairman of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), Draghi, has stated “regulation must not 
prevent innovation, which is necessary if we are to improve product choices for consumers and 
an expanded access to credit” (Draghi 2009, 8). Furthermore: “The goal will be to strengthen the 
resilience of the system without hindering the processes of market discipline and innovation that 
are essential to the financial sector’s contribution to economic growth” (Draghi 2008, 7).  
 
• The Insurance Sector 
  With respect to insurance, the insurance industry as a whole has been able to absorb the 
damages from terrorism and natural catastrophes. Insurers built appropriate reserves and faced 
their liabilities and thus performing appropriately their role, of course with the intervention and 
support of government that in different forms has supported the industry following the terrorist 
attack and the natural catastrophes.  
  The financial crisis of 2007-8 is more directly related to the theme of this research and 
deserves a greater attention. Harrington (2009) indicates that the industry was affected by the 
2007–8 global financial crisis in a dramatic way: the American International Group, Inc. (AIG). 
The AIG crisis was heavily influenced by credit default swaps written by AIG Financial 
Products, not by insurance policies written by its regulated insurance subsidiaries. AIG also ran 
into major problems with its life insurance subsidiaries’ securities lending program. The holding 
company was highly leveraged, and its overall investment portfolio was significantly exposed to 
reductions in the value of mortgage-related securities. If the financial crisis and AIG intervention 
are to be blamed on ineffective regulation, the blame should reflect the substantial evidence of 
fundamental failures in U.S. and foreign regulation of commercial banking, thrift lending, and 
investment banking. Despite AIG’s enormous exposure to increases in mortgage default rates, it 
is not clear that any of its insurance subsidiaries would have become insolvent if the U.S. 
government had not intervened, i.e., most federal assistance to AIG was paid to banking 
counterparties that federal intervention desired to protect.  
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Spring 2011, Vol. 5, No. 3, p25-68 44 
The History of Insurance: Risk, Uncertainty and Entrepreneurship 
  According to the OECD, “deteriorating economic conditions and rising corporate 
insolvencies resulting from the financial crisis have led to worsened conditions for some lines of 
insurance business, most notably director and officer liability and trade credit insurance. Trade 
credit insurance has been particularly hard hit, with retrenchment by insurers in this sector 
affecting business transactions and bank lending, further aggravating the business 
environment”(OECD 2010, 5). Under these circumstances, the main point of the 2007–8 crisis 
for insurance is whether the insurance industry presents a systemic risk. According to the Geneva 
Association (2010), banks and insurers played markedly different roles in the crisis, i.e., banks, 
and investment companies, not insurers, were the source of the crisis, and they were also much 
harder hit by it. It is worth noting that, excluding those insurers with large quasi-banking 
operations, insurance companies received less than $10 billion in direct government support 
during the crisis, compared with more than $1 trillion given to banks. 
  The FSB, the Bank for International Settlements, and the International Monetary Fund 
have given their definition of systemic risk, which has been supported by the Group of Twenty’s 
finance ministers and central bank governors. The FSB’s definition is the most commonly cited. 
The FSB uses three criteria to assess the systemic risk presented by an institution: size, 
interconnectedness, and substitutability. The IAIS has added a fourth criterion: time—that is, the 
speed of loss transmission to third parties, particularly relevant to insurance, because insurance 
claims, unlike banking obligations, do not immediately generate cash outflows. The view of the 
insurance industry is that although these four criteria are correct and appropriate, activities of 
insurers and reinsurers do not pose a systemic risk. Insurance activities do not pass the test for 
systemic risk relevance, for at least one of the following reasons: 
 
 • limited size, which means that there would not be disruptive effects on financial markets; 
 • slow speed of their impact, which allows insurers to absorb them, e.g., raising capital 
over time or, in a worst case, engaging in an orderly shutting down; 
 • features of their interconnectedness mean that contagion risk would be small. 
 
  Also, historically, insurance has never been the cause of major financial crises that has 
always been prompted by the banking sector. Only two, non-core, activities of insurers could 
have the potential for systemic relevance, assuming that they are conducted on a huge scale and 
are using poor risk-control frameworks: 
 • derivatives trading on non-insurance balance sheets; 
 • mismanagement of short-term funding from commercial paper or securities lending. 
 
  The idea of applying more stringent supervision and, perhaps, more onerous regulations 
to “systemically relevant institutions” is relevant as applying to banks, but not to insurers. The 
question is whether existing regulation adequately mitigates potential systemic risk from these 
non-core activities or whether it needs to be supplemented or replaced with new measures. 
According to the Geneva Association (2010),  the industry is strong and the view is that current 
and already-approved insurance regulatory regimes, e.g., Solvency II in the European Union, 
adequately address insurance activities. Solvency II is a capital adequacy for the insurance 
sector, equivalent to Basel II for the banking sector. It applies to the countries of the European 
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Union (EU), but it constitutes a standard to which other regulators around the world are 
watching. Solvency II is a comprehensive principle and economic-based regulatory and 
supervision framework applied to all entities within an insurance group (regulated or non-
regulated). Solvency II, supported by sound industry risk management practices, is intended to 
mitigate the potential systemic risk related to insurance activities. In this context, insolvencies 
need not be avoided at any price. Faced with a very large event, an insurer can fail; but in 
contrast to the banking sector, closing down an insurer is an orderly process that does not 
generate systemic risk.  
  In seeking to close the remaining gaps in the supervisory framework, regulators should 
avoid to place special burdens on insurance companies that could distort the insurance market by 
skewing pricing, reducing aggregate market risk-bearing capacity, drawing supervisors’ attention 
away from risky activities going on elsewhere, and creating moral hazard in “too big to fail” 
institutions. In this regard, these five measures recommended by the Geneva Association (2010) 
seek to either address gaps in regulation and industry practices (measures 1 and 2), or strengthen 
financial stability (measures 3 to 5): 
 
1. Implement comprehensive, integrated, and principle-based supervision for insurance 
groups; 
2. Strengthen liquidity risk management; 
3. Enhance the regulation of financial guarantee insurance; 
4. Establish macro-prudential monitoring with appropriate insurance representation; 
5. Strengthen risk management practices. 
 
  The measures have been largely accepted in the international discussions and are 
considered to constitute part of the insurance industry’s engagement including cooperation 
among supervisors (i.e., cross-border crisis management remains an area requiring improved 
coordination among supervisors) in contributing to the discussion on systemic risk, to the 
stability of the overall financial system, and to performing its enabling role in the real economy. 
 
3. Considerations from the History of Insurance  
From the historical analysis several considerations emerge related to: 
a. The factors of insurance; 
b. The relationship between insurance and economic growth;  
c. The interactions between entrepreneurship and insurance; 
d. The role of insurance as a crucial institution in a capitalist economy;  
e. The specificities of Latin American countries; 
f. The implications of the 2007/8 crisis and the role of effective public policy. 
These considerations are spelled out next. 
a. The Factors of Insurance 
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The conceptual analysis, history and literature indicate that the idea of insurance is very 
old and the lower the degree of civilization of humanity, the weaker its ability to escape the 
dangers that threaten it.  There are four fundamental factors at the root of insurance:  
(i) the spirit of entrepreneurship, which drives the motivation of reducing  
uncertainty and converting it into risk and make it urgent and compelling;  
(ii) the spirit of association, which leads to the organization of guilds and the like to 
protect individuals, groups, and communities from various threatening situations 
and operates as the other face of the spirit of entrepreneurship;  
(iii) the pressure of religious motivations, which direct people to select various forms 
of protection, and 
(iv) the influence of research on insurance operations.  
 
It is useful to briefly examine each. 
i. First, a main factor that drives the development of insurance is the spirit of 
entrepreneurship. As we have seen the entrepreneurial spirit operates under a certain accepted 
level of uncertainty and plays an economic role largely recognized (Baumol 2010, 2-8) and 
directly linked to innovations and their introduction in economic life, and it thus constitutes the 
main driver in seeking to reduce uncertainty and to develop forms of protection and of insurance. 
The entrepreneurial process is the so-called creative destruction of Joseph Schumpeter that the 
Austrian School developed further (see Schumpeter 1942, 80–84; Hayek 1945, 1948; Ferguson 
2009, 349–50; Posner 2010, 99; Kling and Schulz 2009, 4, 182–83, 213). The drive to improve, 
and to profit from innovations normally contradicts the existing order, creates discontinuities and 
determines new uncertainties that need to be properly understood to prevent abuses and crashes. 
This process of creative destruction, however, is not linear, and the introduction of innovations 
may generate situations in which uncertainties are not eliminated but instead increased, like the 
global financial crisis of 2007–8. In this context, entrepreneurship prompts the emergence of 
insurance as a market institution beneficial to economic activity. The motivation to reduce or 
eliminate uncertainty and provide for contingencies was felt in earlier times and shaped the 
development of insurance. Though people did not then have at their disposal all the means 
available today (e.g., knowledge about the probabilities of occurrence of an event), they were 
able to develop certain—albeit inefficient and imperfect—methods to protect valuables. For 
example: the bottomry used in Babylon; convoy ships, traveling under naval protection and 
originating in Hamburg, were an early substitute for marine insurance; the practices of collecting 
building materials or money, or storing goods for the benefit of flood victims, are a substitute for 
flood or fire insurance, and have survived to this day (an example of this can be found in ports, 
for instance Bergen, Norway). Against this background, one should note “the most basic 
financial impulse is to save for the future because the future is unpredictable” (Ferguson 2009, 
177, 185). Insurance constitutes a form of saving, i.e., long-term saving. Thus, a thriving 
insurance sector is of vital importance to every modern economy -first because it encourages the 
savings habit; and second because it provides a safety net to enterprises and productive 
individuals. Moreover, the savings fuel the economy as they are invested by way of financial 
intermediation and thus help realize the initiatives of entrepreneurs.  
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ii. The second key factor for the development of insurance is humanity’s public spirit, the 
spirit of association, i.e., people’s inherent need to associate with others, or simply “mutuality.” 
Mutuality follows three main principles (see MIA 2010):  
• self-help (i.e., solidarity among people in the group to achieve common goals);  
• self-governance (i.e., members manage and control the group and the cooperative in a 
democratic manner); and  
• self-responsibility (i.e., members collectively underwrite the performance of the risk 
pool, which implies that profit and losses are distributed among members only).  
 
The family (or clan, or tribe) was the first and fundamental social unit, built up on the 
mutuality principle of “all for one and one for all.” Its members owned their property jointly, 
shared risks, and together provided for their needs. However, the basis for this mutuality was not 
a premium payment in the modern sense but the personal service of the single members. 
Therefore, family, tribe, and clan lacked the essential requirement for insurance: association for 
the sharing of risks. In fact, the association of the members of one related group for this purpose 
did not meet this requirement, inasmuch as the property was held in common and individual 
participation in it was ideal, the members of each economic unit being strictly interdependent.  
The spirit of association called into existence social welfare organizations like the 
medieval guilds and other societies. The guilds—an association of craftsmen in a particular 
trade—began to admit nonmembers into the organization upon payment of a sum of money. We 
may safely assume that, if the otherwise exclusive guilds opened their doors to outsiders, it was 
not done in the public spirit but in the interest of the members who prompted this opening. They 
expected advantages for the guild from the money from outsiders. The next step in this 
development was voluntary associations of people not tied by the same professional interest—
inspired by the changed policy of the guilds.  
From its very inception, the development of insurance showed two distinctly different 
tendencies: the capitalist and the cooperative. These two parallel tendencies did not develop 
independently from each other, but were for the most part so closely interwoven that it was 
almost impossible to draw a distinction between them. The capitalist tendency is equivalent to 
the spirit of entrepreneurship, which would see opportunities in business initiatives, and likewise 
try to reduce uncertainty and cover risk. The cooperative tendency corresponds to the public 
spirit of association of humanity and prompts developments in the field of compulsory insurance 
and various forms of direct intervention by government, culminating in the welfare state. Over 
time Government intervention spread over various insurance activities with the objective of 
reducing uncertainty often beyond the failures of market. An important form of government 
intervention, which tends to balance and channel the spirit of innovation, is that of the regulation 
and supervision of insurance activities. Regulation and supervision have always struggled 
between the introduction of appropriate innovative instruments that reduce uncertainty3  and 
make it quantifiable, and thus convert it into risk, and ultimately boost economic activity and 
growth and burdensome, potholed, inefficient innovations that threaten the system and lead to 
crises and disasters.  
                                                 
3 But possibly crate new forms of uncertainty. 
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iii. Third, religious considerations influenced the development of insurance and often 
played a part in insurance-like activities, e.g., in medieval guilds and corporations (Barro and 
McCleary, 2006; Carr and Landa, 1983; Clark and Lelkes, 2005). Throughout history, devotion 
to old traditions and to superstitions has substituted insurance policies and hampered the progress 
of insurance in many countries (Noland, 2005).  Hostility to insurance as a wicked and sinful 
interference with the divine is a phenomenon that in the remote past and even today prevents the 
development of insurance. For instance, the canon law of the Church in force in European 
countries for centuries, which forbade interest charges as usury, controlled the development of 
capitalist insurance. In the Islamic conception, certain forms of insurance are branded as usury. 
Islamic law forbids life insurance because the beneficiary might “profit” from someone else’s 
death, e.g., a practical substitute for life insurance in Islamic countries is called Kataful, which 
stresses shared responsibility and mutual insurance (Khorshid 2004). Against this background, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the Islamic inhabitants of Beirut were forbidden to take 
out life insurance. The slow and late development of the insurance business in Japan in the late 
nineteenth century was mainly due to the innumerable old customs and traditions that dominated 
economic life during the period of Japan’s isolation. It is paradoxical that at its inception (in the 
Middle Ages), almost every form of insurance has had to cope with the accusation of immorality 
and illegality. No type of insurance—life, liability, credit, or unemployment—has escaped this. 
The hostility of religion to insurance can be explained by the fact that insurance could provide 
answers to events and phenomenon that were considered of divine origination and thus 
inexplicable. In other words, the role of religion is to explain uncertainty as a superiors order and 
dimension, while insurance markets eliminate uncertainty and substitute it with coverage of risk. 
iv. Fourth, research has accompanied the development of insurance, even though, 
particularly in early times, insurance contracts were not based on a quantitative assessment of 
risks in the probabilistic sense. Pascal (Franklin 2003) opened a very significant area that of 
probabilities and statistics of continuous research in support of insurance. Studies and research 
have intensified in the last 50 years.  In the 1970s, research on insurance was dominated by 
optimal insurance coverage, security design, and equilibrium under conditions of imperfect 
information. In the 1980s, an emphasis was placed on theoretical developments, including 
unexpected utility, price volatility, retention capacity, the pricing and design of insurance 
contracts in the presence of multiple risks, and the liability insurance crisis. The empirical study 
of information problems, financial derivatives dominated the research agenda in the 1990s and 
early 2000s as well as the issue of access to financial services and insurance for the poor, micro 
entrepreneurs, and small businesses. Catastrophic events, terrorism and the global financial crisis 
of 2007–8, while reaffirmed the key role of insurance, have exposed flaws – particularly 
following the financial crisis- in the regulatory and supervisory system and prompted studies, 
researches and calls to effectively regulate the sector. In other words, research supports the 
introduction, implementation and review of insurance policy beneficial to economic activity. 
However, as we have seen, there are instances in which the insurance is undertaken in absence of 
knowledge of events and their probability of occurrence. 
b.    Insurance and Economic Growth  
In various periods of history, the relationships among business activity, economic growth, 
and financial sector represent a recurrent theme and insurance has been part of it. The literature 
supports the crucial roles of financial and insurance markets. Various economic historians such 
as Davis (1965), Cameron (1967), Sylla (1969), and Wright and Cowen (2006) have shown that 
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in the United Kingdom and in the United States the availability of financing encouraged potential 
entrepreneurs to formulate new business ideas so that economic growth in these countries has 
been fueled by the role of financial intermediation. Thus the financial sector mobilized the 
resources needed to start large projects in the pre-industrial period and had incentive effects in 
the real sector that extended beyond those firms that actually received financing (Rousseau 
2003).  
In this context, one has to discern the role of insurance. From the perspective of 
economic history, there have been various explanations of the relationship between insurance 
and economic growth. 
 i. Historians formerly regarded financial and commercial services including insurance as 
essentially derivative of the industrial economy and as subject to criticism if they were not 
delivered rationally or efficiently (Pearson 1997b). The traditional view -particularly of the 
insurance industry- argues that insurance followed the Industrial Revolution rather than leading 
it, favoring it, or making it possible.  
ii. A different view is that financial and insurance services are autonomous important, 
and instrumental to the development of economic activity. The notion of innovation lies at the 
heart of this argument, because it is indeed “central to most concepts of the Industrial 
Revolution” (Hudson 1992, 3). However, in contrast to the attention devoted to industrial 
invention, there has been limited investigation of the process of innovation in financial services 
and its role in promoting the economic, productive sector. There has been some consideration of 
whether British financial services – including insurance- have been particularly innovative and 
successful by international standards, and have influenced positively the relationship between 
financial innovation and economic growth (Hudson 1992).  
Along these lines, in the interpretation of the long-run development of modern 
economies, a new emphasis has been put on the size and performance of the service sector. 
Taking the case of the United Kingdom, Rubinstein (1993) has argued that Britain’s 
“comparative advantage” always lay in commerce and finance, which he claims is a “highly 
surprising contention,” although one that is less surprising to economic historians than to 
nonspecialists. The middle-class wealth, the distribution of employment, and the success of the 
City of London in comparison with manufacturing provide significant evidence. The period 
1770–1860 marked a “partial and equivocal upsurge of industry and manufacturing,” which did 
not halt the “secular trend” toward a commercial and financial economy (Rubinstein, 1993, 22-
44). Similarly, Cain and Hopkins (1993, 19-22) have claimed that “financial and commercial 
services have not received the historical recognition they deserve; they were in fact much more 
important in terms of output and employment before, during and after the Industrial Revolution, 
than standard interpretations of British economic history allow.” In particular, they have 
emphasized the “productivity gains” that arose from innovations in banking, insurance, legal 
services, transport, and communications. Lee (1986, 1990) has also emphasized the importance 
of financial institutions as “the essential centerpiece” of the British and international economies, 
particularly starting in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
iii. Barras (1986, 1990) has examined the impact of information technology on financial 
services, such as insurance and retail banking, since the 1960s (see Ferguson 2009, 343–44). 
Drawing heavily from Barras (1990), the argument is that there is an interaction between new 
technologies in the capital goods industries (i.e., computer manufacturing) and innovation in the 
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adopting service industries, and this interaction occurs by way of the two product cycles working 
in opposite directions, so that manufacturing innovation moves from an emphasis on product to 
process, while services innovation does the reverse.  Thus, as product innovation declines in 
industry, it accelerates in services. Why was there absence of new primary products in the British 
insurance markets before the 1840s? What explains the failure of the large established fire 
insurance offices to develop such products? The answers to these questions are that five factors 
may have determined the timing and rate of innovation in British insurance: technological 
opportunity; conservative corporate culture in leading firms; costs associated with uncertainty, 
legal obstacles; and market structures. According to Barras (1986, 1990), the innovation process 
in insurance suggests something less dramatic than revolutionary change in the service sector 
during the Industrial Revolution in Britain. It places a question mark after the emphasis placed 
by Rubinstein (1993), Cain and Hopkins (1993), and others on the dynamism of the financial 
sector. Insurance innovation was incremental for a long period before building up to a crescendo 
of new product development in the more sophisticated markets of the late nineteenth century. 
Barras (1986, 1990) and Pearson (1997) relate this process to the industrial economy by 
supporting the view of a parallel relationship between insurance innovation and industrial 
growth.  
iv. Against this background, a comparison has been made between industrial growth in 
the United States and the United Kingdom (Hartmann and Wheeler 1979) and the long phases of 
insurance innovation (1780–1840, 1840–80, and 1880–1914). Drawing from the authors, there 
are at least three ways of interpreting this. First, there may have been a time lag between the 
Schumpeterian clusters of new industrial products in the downswings and the commencement of 
new phases of insurance innovation. This implies, however, that there is a direct correlation 
between the latter and technological opportunity, which was not clearly evident. Second, it might 
be that there was no relationship at all between innovation in the industrial and service sectors, 
but this seems unlikely, especially for fire and marine insurance during these years. A third 
interpretation is that financial services innovation stood in a rather weak and lagged inverse 
relationship with cycles of activity in the industrial economy. Following the chronology of the 
Hartmann and Wheeler (1979) cycles of industrial and infrastructural innovation, it seems that 
their periods of high aggregate levels of capital formation and innovation were not the most 
active periods of product innovation in insurance. This is true for the years 1760–89, most of the 
period 1813–49, and for the early part of the period 1873–96. Conversely, periods of low 
industrial innovation appear to somewhat correspond with periods of greater process and product 
innovation in insurance. When manufacturing investment tailed off (e.g., between the 1790s and 
1813), there was a considerable acceleration of process innovation and there was rapid growth in 
the numbers of fire and life insurance offices. The same applies, with the addition of product 
innovation in insurance, for much of the periods 1849–73 and 1896–1914.   
In this context, in the early stages of the insurance industry’s expansion, companies may 
have been unwilling to accept new risks generated by new technologies and the increasing size 
of the industry, and they may have resisted innovating in response to such risks. This may have 
been partly because of prudence, as a consequence of technical and event uncertainties in 
underwriting, and partly the result of legal and other factors making it difficult to acquire the 
funds needed to cover the new types of risk. In the conditions of rapid industrial expansion, 
insurers may have faced liquidity constraints, which hindered their ability (or willingness) to 
finance the innovations needed to service this expansion. Though industry expands while 
generating a high internal rate of return, insurers have had to depend to a considerable extent 
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upon the money market yields on their investments to acquire the liquidity needed to provide the 
insurance cover for this expansion. Therefore, the higher the margin between its internal rate of 
return and the money market rate, the faster the industry expands—and this margin is thus 
known as the marginal rate of return. However, the larger this margin becomes, the greater the 
difficulty insurers face in trying to service this expansion (and finance innovation). 
One can argue that while there may be a positive correlation between interest rates and 
innovation in financial services—high and volatile rates being associated with liquidity 
constraints, which in turn induce innovation—the correlation between the marginal rate of return 
as defined here and services innovation may be negative. Industrial expansion encouraged by a 
large margin between the internal rate of return and money market rates brings liquidity 
problems, which militate against innovation, possibly by making insurers more risk averse. If 
insurers become risk averse, they may seek to deal with the problem by raising premiums on 
existing products rather than developing new products. Although this has the potential for 
spurring process and product innovation as new entrants are attracted by high premiums, the lag 
before this occurs may be sufficiently long for the inverse relationship between the marginal rate 
of return and insurance innovation at any point in time not to be much disturbed. 
This hypothesis, therefore, suggests that insurers would be prepared to take on significant 
new risks (and develop new products) only when industrial expansion is slowing down, as 
reflected in the narrowing of the margin between industrial and money market rates of return. 
However, as the insurer’s financial ability (via greater liquidity) and technical ability (via process 
innovations) to take on new risks are improved, the opportunity to seek new risks may decline as 
industrial growth slows down. If there is a time lag, and the chronologies of the cyclical models 
for industry and insurance outlined above suggest that there was, any acceleration in process and 
product innovation might reflect competition between insurers in a market with fewer 
opportunities. A preliminary scrutiny of the shorter period 1790–1850 suggests some support for 
this thesis. The late 1790s and early 1800s were years of rising but increasingly volatile prices in 
the money markets, and, for industry, possibly a narrowing of the marginal rate of return. They 
were also years of considerable change—new entrants and process innovations—in fire 
insurance. The postwar decades after 1815 witnessed deflationary and stabilizing trends in the 
money markets—despite periodic crises, stock prices became much less volatile—and possibly a 
reversal of the trend toward convergence in the marginal rate of return for industry. There was 
certainly acceleration in capital investment activity in the textile industries during this period. 
Fire insurance was characterized by the emergence of a degree of competitive equilibrium in the 
1830s and early 1840s, with little evidence of product innovation.  
Empirical analysis has not verified conclusively the propositions also given the difficulty 
of obtaining data. There is insufficient knowledge about the levels and forms of liquidity 
constraints faced by those providing financial services in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
and there has not been much comparative statistical analysis of the changing margins between 
internal rates of return in different industries and money market rates in the same period. Though 
it has been suggested above that some factors internal to the world of insurance and unrelated to 
the industrial economy may have been important in shaping the cycle of insurance innovation, it 
is clear that the worlds of insurance and industry were not distinct in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Therefore, the relationship between insurance and economic growth has to 
pass through the impact that insurance has on entrepreneurship and economic activity. 
c. The Interactions between Entrepreneurship and Insurance  
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To fully understand the relationship between insurance and economic growth, one needs 
to consider the role of entrepreneurship and examine whether the link between insurance and 
economic growth operates through entrepreneurship.  
Landes, Mokyr, and Baumol (2010) explore the entrepreneur’s role in society from 
antiquity to the present. The study examines the deployment of entrepreneurship over time and in 
different geographical locations looking at social and institutional influences from a historical 
context, i.e., the history of enterprises in Mesopotamia and Neo-Babylon; of the Islamic Middle 
East; of China, Japan, and Colonial India; and the role of the entrepreneur in innovative activities 
in Europe and the United States, from the Middle Ages to today.  Landes, Mokyr, and Baumol 
(2010, 533) present examples that provide lessons for promoting and successfully pursuing 
entrepreneurship as a means of contributing to economic growth and to the welfare of society. 
Throughout history entrepreneurs struggle to conquer and reduce uncertainty operating in 
parallel with the development of insurance systems. Over time, entrepreneurship and insurance 
have shown complementarities and have been mutually reinforcing and instrumental to economic 
growth.  
Entrepreneurship is part of economic activity, and the taxonomy of economic activity as 
including large companies, SMEs, entrepreneurs, micro entrepreneurs, and the poor segment of 
population applies to advanced and emerging market countries as well. However, the ways in 
which the categories of actors—and entrepreneurs—are served are very different, depending on 
the level of economic and institutional development in the two groups of countries and among 
emerging market countries.  
The literature and the various historical explanations about the relationship between 
insurance and economic growth supports the view that there is a continuous interaction between 
insurance and economic growth and that the insurance industry contributes economic growth and 
national prosperity (Buckham and others 2011, 7). At the macro level, insurance improves the 
efficiency of the economy by increasing productivity and the transfer of risk to whom is able to 
bear it at lower cost. At the micro level, insurance reduces the negative financial impacts of 
events and help people to cover the risks and organize their business. It allows the undertaking of 
economic initiatives, e.g., the development of the North Sea oil. Insurance operates against 
business and family contingencies, e.g., health insurance and reduces the overall level of 
uncertainty. 
Finally, the insurance industry constitutes a vehicle whereby savings are converted into 
long term investments.  
A lack of effective insurance markets increases the overall uncertainty of the institutional 
setting, reducing the drive and initiative of entrepreneurs, who become more risk-averse and 
unwilling to push for innovation and undertake business initiatives while assuming business risk. 
The brief history of insurance supports the view (High 2009) that insurance emerges as a market 
institution as a consequence of entrepreneurship and certainly shows that the two phenomena—
entrepreneurship and insurance—develop in parallel. Thus, one needs to test empirically the 
interaction between the insurance and entrepreneurship and also find out whether the 
development of insurance facilitates the utilization of the human abilities, talents, and 
entrepreneurship that in turn prompt economic activity and growth. 
d. Insurance as a Market Institution  
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In the economic and business activities, insurance play key functions: 
• Insurers measure and manage the nondiversifiable risk faced by creditors and 
borrowers, facilitating the provision of credit.  
• Insurance companies mobilize substantial funds through contractual savings products, 
and by investing them in bonds and stocks, facilitate long-term investments and the 
growth of debt and equity markets. In this context, insurance companies—as 
institutional investors—can pressure equity markets to adopt stronger corporate 
governance measures and greater transparency. 
• Insurance markets support and create the conditions for economic growth; but to 
perform this function, they must operate effectively and respond to needs and not 
favor inefficient solutions. 
  
Thus the fourth consideration that comes out of the history and the literature is the 
importance of insurance for the deployment of business activity that makes insurance a crucial 
institution for society, e.g., insurance policies that are enforceable constitute the response to 
natural and human uncertainty (Ericson and Doyle, 5).  
Natural uncertainty is related to natural events (e.g., a given illness, or a severe natural 
disaster). On the basis of historical data and actuarial analysis, probabilities are derived and the 
market participants can translate uncertainty into risk and produce insurance contracts -different 
across countries and over time- to cover a number of possible outcomes. Dealing effectively with 
natural uncertainty requires the development of scientific knowledge, databases, institutions, and 
markets.  
Human uncertainty has to do with events related to human activities (robbery, accidents, 
and also to a certain extent terrorism). Human uncertainty is also associated with illegal activities 
(e.g., piracy) and recently terrorist activities constitute areas for which it is still difficult to 
provide an appropriate insurance policy.  
An additional level of uncertainty relates to the enforcement of contracts in general and 
of insurance contracts, or policies, in particular.  Erbas (2004) argues that dealing with human 
uncertainty requires instruments, predictable rules of governance and freedom of recourse to 
trustworthy processes for arbitration and adjudication, and all this represents a powerful 
instrument for economic growth. With respect to human activities, scientific knowledge, 
including probability is equally important than legislation for contracts to reduce uncertainty. Of 
course, trust—existing and produced in a given society—represents a crucial ingredient for 
building solid and effective institutions including insurance. According to Erbas (2004), modern 
institutions, whether they have evolved throughout history or have been adopted or inherited, set 
the incentive structures, e.g., contract laws aim at the expeditious and fair settlement of disputes. 
This aim is broadly comparable across countries, regardless of their level of development. But 
contract law in some countries may be less transparent than in others. Transparency does not 
only pertain to what is written in books. It also pertains to the level of trust and social capital and 
to the efficacy and reliability of adjudication and enforcement; at those levels, many events and 
outcomes are possible.  
History shows how insurance policies and contracts have evolved over time and over 
space (e.g., in advanced and emerging economies) and have tended to respond to the needs of 
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entrepreneurs and instrumental to economic activity. Information and data, their dissemination to 
markets, and their systemic use in decision making improve the capability of the entrepreneur 
(and any other individual) to assess risks and contingencies and make decisions. Insurance 
markets respond to the different needs of agents for buying insurance policies, i.e., life, business, 
and property. All this constitutes an institutional function of facilitating economic activities and 
growth. Insurance is a market institution that establishes itself through time to reduce uncertainty 
about the range and variety of possible events and the damage such events may cause.  Thus 
insurance is a natural complement to entrepreneurship and constitutes a market institution along 
the lines of the theory of emergent institutions (High 2009). 
However, considerable uncertainty remains about some outcomes for which markets fail 
to provide insurance in both developed and emerging market countries, and there are situations 
where uncertainty emerges and develops with the dynamics of an evolving society (e.g., 
technology, natural disaster). In addition, in many emerging countries, institutional setting 
remains a concern and does not favor the undertakings by entrepreneurs. The range and variety 
of possible natural and human events determine the level of uncertainty. Insurance based and 
operating on market principles can provide coverage to various forms of exposures and reduce 
the overall uncertainty. History shows that in many cases Government intervenes to reduce or 
eliminate insurance with the greater risk or distorting the functioning of the market. 
The history and the literature display that what insurance will not cover is the intuition of 
the entrepreneur to enter a certain market, become successful, and be rewarded. Insurance does 
not cover bad business judgment. However, if, in a given country, entrepreneurs and investors 
perceive adjudication and enforcement as ambiguous, then, for a given rate of return, they will 
prefer countries with less uncertainty. In other words, entrepreneurs and investors prefer 
countries with better institutions. Alternatively, investors will seek higher rates of return as a 
quid pro quo for investing in countries with uncertain institutional settings. However, the 
entrepreneur’s uncertainty will never go away, and he or she will always react to (unquantifiable) 
“uncertainty” that only his or her alertness can understand and that typically characterizes his or 
her added value. 
In this context, insurance plays an institutional role in the sense of covering the existing 
risk and also reducing the overall level of uncertainty and thus stimulating economic activity and 
growth.  
f. The Specificities of Latin American Countries 
Latin American and Caribbean countries present specific features in general terms and 
with respect to the development of the insurance sector. 
In general, the lack of development of Latin American countries depends on several 
factors that have roots in cultural attitudes (Arias 2011, 2-6). 
A first one is the lack of perseverance in the pursuit of changes and innovations. In this regard, 
this implies that when it comes to entrepreneurship, Latin American countries have more 
controllers than entrepreneurs.  
A second general aspect is the low level of trust that exists in Latin American countries, 
which prompts legal insecurity and limited confidence.  
A third aspect is the fragility of democratic systems and the emergency of authoritarian 
regimes. 
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All this leads to a situation that since the independence from Spain and Portugal in the 
late 19th century, none of the Latin American countries can be considered truly developed, with 
the possible exception of the recent emergency of Brazil.  
The history of insurance in Latin America follows broadly experiences similar to those of 
Europe and North America, though at a different point in time. However, three important aspects 
emerge from the history of insurance in Latin America:  
a. The early dependence of insurance from colonial countries has limited and retarded the 
emergence and development of local capabilities;  
b. The retardation has been enhanced due to the intrusive intervention of the Government 
in the insurance business with the argument to reduce foreign influence. The protectionist 
policy decisions for the insurance sector are part of a larger policy of protection that Latin 
America government followed and were among the reasons that delayed the 
establishment of a competitive environment and the development of insurance market; 
c. Insurance companies much more than in other parts of the world, have been serving the 
interests of Governments and big companies rather than those of the common 
entrepreneur. 
d. Insurance markets in emerging market countries, and particularly in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, show some progress and advances and also promising areas, such as 
agriculture and micro insurance. However, there is still a lack of adequate depth and 
penetration, and the region is behind other regions of the world based on standardized 
measures of insurance relative to economic development. 
In Latin American emerging market countries, business insurance is still very often 
unavailable and/or mispriced. The insurance industry in Latin America, including Brazil, still has 
to deal with low efficiency, low penetration, limits to competition and narrow attitude to 
deregulation and liberalization compared with the 1990s. In addition to the personal setbacks 
from unemployment, divorce, unforeseen medical expenses, or a death in the family, widespread 
disasters such as droughts, floods, endemic illness, crop failures, and economic downturns often 
affect people badly, and mainly poor people. Informal insurance mechanisms provide limited 
protection, and people are overwhelmed by major or recurring calamities. Most people cannot 
obtain formal insurance, and thus the lack of private, effective insurance policies contributes to 
making the institutional setting unreliable and causing an excessive level of uncertainty and 
specific risks that are not covered, and this constrains investment, economic growth, and poverty 
reduction.  
As indicated throughout, limited formal insurance mechanisms, low level of trust in the 
institutional setting and its enforcement, and in some cases lack of awareness of the existence of 
insurance products all lead to inefficient, inequitable economic solutions. Under these 
circumstances, as Sen (1999) states, the key point is that insurance allows everyone, and 
particularly poor people, to improve their economic potential and become less dependent on 
welfare state programs. Thus, insurance market development is justified by efficiency and equity 
concerns.  
However, the situation has changed at the beginning of this century and also following 
the crisis of 2007-8. Prospects of low inflation and high economic growth prompt businesses’ 
opportunities for a class of entrepreneurs that starts to emerge and in turn allow the insurance 
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industry to respond to a growing and latent demand. It is very significant to see that insurance 
policies are in demand at the moment in which in Latin America there is a very large movement 
of favoring innovation and entrepreneurship. Within this context, Brazil is a leader in 
entrepreneurship, with a likely one in eight adults being “entrepreneur.” Large part of the 
business is carried out by single individuals who sells his/her homemade goods or offers his or 
her services. 
These considerations lead to two related questions: is the availability of insurance a 
supply problem, which implies that better insurance markets would favor economic activity and 
entrepreneurship? And should public policy realize that a gap exists and promote the availability 
of insurance instruments, in various forms, for the general public? These questions are at the core 
of the research outlined here. The task is to identify the specific contribution of insurance to the 
economic process, possibly through the intermediation of entrepreneurship—i.e., to uncover the 
relationship between insurance and entrepreneurship. 
A related area of interest is that of the effectiveness of the insurance market in the sense 
that the working of insurance responds to the needs and demand of the various clients, i.e., 
customers, regulators, policy makers. 
g. The Role of Effective Public Policy in Financial and Insurance Markets 
To lay the foundations of the role of public policy to insurance, it is important to start 
from the considerations that emerge from the crisis.  
The first consideration is that the Financial Revolution of the 1980s did not eliminate 
uncertainty. The future is not entirely predictable, because uncertainty can appear in new forms 
(e.g., human and social behavior, natural disasters, terrorism), and complex and complicated 
models are not always able to represent risk appropriately and transform uncertainty into risk. 
The 2007-08 crisis shows the limitations of rationality and efficient markets. The battle of 
innovation and entrepreneurship against uncertainty still rages.  
The ultimate responsibility of the financial crisis of 2007-8 rests with financial executives 
who bundled risky assets such as subprime mortgages and complex structured products; with 
rating agencies that endorsed AAA ratings allowing structural products to be shifted off balance 
sheets; and with regulators and supervisors unable to assess the potential systemic risk of these 
products (Bauckham 2011, 55). In this context, one of the outcomes of the global financial crisis 
of 2007–8 is the rethinking of the regulation and supervision framework in order to make it more 
effective worldwide, fostering innovation, without allowing for situations where firms are too big 
to fail and thus operate in a climate of lack of market discipline and wrong incentives (Ferguson 
2009, 360). 
At the same time, the financial crisis of 2007-8 has dramatically demonstrated the 
essential role that responsive financial markets play for the economic activity: “every business 
need the right kind of financing at the right time in order to succeed....The recent financial crisis 
drove home this simple truth” (Allen and Yago, 2010, 51) and how failure of banking and capital 
markets determines economic crisis and in turns prompts the intervention of Government that 
may interfere with the functioning of markets. Therefore, the need of functioning financial 
markets opens, or reopens, the doors to Government intervention and questions its proper limits 
(Brown 2010, 10-13) and particularly the so called strategy for exit once the crisis is over and the 
role of state-owned banks (see the debate that the World Bank opened about the role of state 
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Spring 2011, Vol. 5, No. 3, p25-68 57
The History of Insurance: Risk, Uncertainty and Entrepreneurship 
owned banks, http://blogs.worldbank.org/allaboutfinance/the-question-can-state-owned-banks-
play-an-important-role-in-promoting-financial-stability-and-acces). 
In addition, there is a view (Cline 2011, 260) that while globalization and capital account 
openness -one of the major reforms of the 1980s and 1990s- might have been instrumental to the 
contagion and favored the spreading of the crisis, there is no evidence that greater financial 
openness caused more severe spillover to domestic economies. Thus there is no reason to reverse 
the reforms and opening of financial markets.   
With respect to the insurance sector, dramatic structural changes in the industry in the last 
40 years have burdened the abilities of policymakers and regulators to maintain effective and 
adequate roles in promoting the development of financial and insurance markets and providing 
direct intervention and also oversight of insurers’ solvency and market practices (Ericson and 
Doyle 2004, 29,265,293). Despite natural catastrophes and terrorist human events are difficult to 
predict and to model, the insurance systems has shown that it is able to provide protection. 
Terrorism, natural events and the financial crisis have to a certain extent reaffirmed the 
independence of insurance from banking and capital markets to avoid that insurance companies 
are embroiled in banking and capital markets crises that detach them from their core insurance 
business and clients.  
The view of insurance experts and practitioners (Harrington 2009; Geneva Association 
2010) is that systemic risk is relatively low in insurance markets compared with banking, 
especially for property and casualty insurance, in part because insurers hold greater amounts of 
capital in relation to their liabilities, reducing their vulnerability to shocks. During the crisis of 
2007–8, insurers maintained a relatively steady capacity, business volumes, and prices. Those 
few insurers that experienced serious difficulties, most notably AIG, were brought down not by 
their insurance business but by their quasi-banking activities. Similarly, the troubled 
“monoliners” (i.e., FSA, AMBAC, and MBIA) concentrated exclusively on financial guarantees 
and writing and trading credit-default swaps. According to this view, the application of Solvency 
II would have probably prevented the 2007-8 crises. One important response to the crisis, - for a 
complete view of the policies undertaken by various countries, see Annex to OECD 2010, Policy 
and regulatory responses to the financial crisis-  is the July 2010 US overhaul of the financial 
system. The US legislation creates  a new regulatory body at the federal level – the Federal 
Insurance Office (FIO) inside the Treasury Department to monitor insurers particularly from the 
point of view of the systemic risk- can strengthen the independence of the sector (see section 
below on the role of effective public policy). Under these circumstances, a study to be presented 
by 2012 is expected to recommend ways to further overhaul regulation of the insurance industry. 
Moreover, the insurance sector in emerging countries has not witnessed crisis related to the 
involvement of insurers with banking, quasi banking and speculative activities. This also 
provides some evidence that the insurance sector in emerging countries remains underdeveloped 
and unsophisticated. 
The insurance business model (see Box 1) - encompassing both insurers and reinsurers - 
has specific features that make it a source of stability in the financial system. Insurance is funded 
by upfront premiums, giving insurers strong operating cash flow without requiring wholesale 
funding. Insurance policies are generally long term, with controlled outflows, enabling insurers 
to act as stabilizers to the financial system. The history has shed light on how insurance emerges 
as a market institution and on the role of public policies and Government in this process. Greene 
(1976) provides us with a review of the rationale for intervention by government in insurance 
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markets and concludes that although not all government insurance is unjustified, some appears to 
be based on weak grounds. However, the main justification for Government intervention – 
particularly with various forms of insurance- is to reduce uncertainty and promote economic 
activity when market is not available (Ericson and Doyle, 2004, 29; Clive and Granger 2011).  
To this end, the crisis of 2007/8 confirmed that government intervention in insurance 
markets should be confined to regulation and supervision, without interfering with market 
functioning.  While the definition of policies and its implementation is done in some situations of 
uncertainty (Stiglitz 2011, 44), the objective of Government should be that of allowing insurance 
markets to establish themselves as market institutions and to perform their role of facilitators of 
business activity.  In this respect, in defining and implementing policies, Government should 
strive to identify and implement incentives to reduce uncertainty and also operate as a sort of 
guarantor of last resort in case of unknown events dealing with uncertainty, e.g., comet striking 
the earth (Granger 2011, 44). 
The main challenge for the future in both emerging and mature markets is to create a 
public policy agenda to make insurance services open, available, and a market institution capable 
to promote entrepreneurship, as well as social and economic growth—without creating unwanted 
administrative obstacles that reduce productive and entrepreneurial initiatives. The policy 
recommendations of the OECD (OECD2010)   move along these lines even though their focus 
seems more on advanced economies. The issue in advanced countries and, to a greater extent, in 
emerging market countries, is to create an effective regulatory and supervisory framework to 
improve the effectiveness and responsiveness of insurance and facilitates access and 
inclusiveness, i.e., large and small companies, entrepreneurs, and micro entrepreneurs need 
insurance to spread risks and reduce uncertainty, without resorting to direct intervention in the 
form of government-sponsored insurance. It is also crucial to maintain a keystone: the distinction 
and independence of insurance activities from banking and capital markets. 
 
BOX 1 The Insurance Model 
The primary purpose of insurance is to meet claims, i.e., the insurer’s risks, at all times. Insurers are exposed to a 
number of solvency risks, which are either technical or investment related. Technical risks are of two types: 
underpricing and under provisioning. Under pricing occurs when the insurer attracts buyers by setting excessively 
low premiums that do not cover the expected claims. Technical reserves represent the largest share of an insurer’s 
debt, and they are a measure of an underwriter’s obligations to its policyholders. In case of under provision, the 
technical reserve is inadequate to meet the obligations. Investment risk is generated by the insurer’s role as a 
financial intermediary and reflects how the insurer’s exposure to insolvency resembles a bank’s.  
Market failure is threatened when the market price does not reflect the insolvency risk. In a world of perfect 
information, economic theory presumes that competition and rational behavior ensure that risk is reflected in 
consumers’ willingness to pay, thereby inducing efficient risk management among insurers. To correctly assess 
the insurer’s solvency, however, the buyer should have accurate data on the joint distribution of loss claims, the 
return on the insurer’s asset portfolio, and the technical reserves that the insurer will hold when benefits are paid. 
In practice, however, because such information is costly or unavailable for buyers, it is plausible to think that they 
cannot fully assess the financial strength of their insurer or the quality of the insurance contract.  
In addition to technical and investment risks, the insurer is also exposed to the possibility of default by a partner 
(e.g., a reinsurer) or of mismanagement, as well as to systemic risk. Conversely, the insurer cannot fully assess 
the nature of the specific risks of the potential insured and cannot control his or her actions. 
These considerations point to the fact that asymmetric information, in the form of moral hazard and adverse 
selection, constitutes significant aspects of insurance that can lead to market failure. Moral hazard refers to 
situations in which one side of the market cannot observe the actions of the other and that insurance policies have 
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the effect of reducing the insured’s initiatives to reduce expected losses. For this reason, it is sometimes called a 
“hidden-action problem” (Varian 1990).  Adverse selection occurs when a negotiation between two people with 
different amounts of information—that is asymmetric information—restricts the quality of the good being traded 
(and its price). It refers to the situation in which consumers have different expected losses that the insurer is 
unable (or finds too costly) to distinguish and therefore he or she limits the insurance offered or raises the price 
(i.e., premium), at which point only individuals facing high risk sign up and are covered.  
Most theoretical research has focused on the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in the insurance 
market. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that asymmetric information between the insurer and the 
policyholder inhibits the design of an efficient contract when the buyers are heterogeneous in their accident 
probabilities (which are private information for the buyer). Yet the empirical evidence for asymmetric 
information in insurance markets is decidedly mixed. Several recent empirical studies have failed to find 
evidence of asymmetric information in the property-casualty, life, and health insurance markets. These studies 
include Cawley and Philipson (1999), who examine the U.S. life insurance market; Cardon and Hendel (2001), 
who look at the U.S. health insurance market; and Chiappori and Salanie (2000), who focus on the French 
automobile insurance market. In contrast, Cutler (2002) reviews a substantial literature that finds evidence in 
support of asymmetric information in health insurance markets; and Cohen (2001) offers some evidence for 
adverse selection in the U.S. automobile insurance market. Chiappori and Gollier (2006) argue that asymmetric 
information is a central reason that competition in insurance markets may fail to guarantee that all mutually 
advantageous risk exchanges are realized. These results support the conclusion that, depending on the specific 
market and situation, asymmetric information constitutes an important feature of insurance markets. 
 
Regulation and Supervision 
Moral hazard and adverse selection are typical forms of asymmetric information that lead to a risk of insolvency 
as well as to under provisioning of insurance products, pricing and, in the view of most, justify the need for 
government intervention in insurance markets through legal provisioning, regulation, and supervision (OECD 
2003c). Insurance regulatory activities are divided into two primaries categories: solvency and market regulation 
strictly related and to be coordinated to achieve their specific objectives. Solvency regulation seeks to protect 
policy holders against the risk that insurers will not be able to meet their financial obligations. Markets regulation 
affecting insurers ‘financial performance, attempts to ensure fair and reasonable insurance prices, products and 
practices. Insurers are licensed in a given state and are subject to solvency and market regulation in their state of 
domicile and also in the other states and locations where they are licensed to sell insurance. Reinsurers are also 
subject to solvency regulation in their domiciliary state. Some insurers write certain specialty and high-risk 
profiles policies on no-admitted – or surplus- lines basis that is not subject to price and product regulation. 
Regulators still control entry into the no-admitted market by imposing solvency and trust regulation.  An open 
question remains that of the proper mix of regulation and government intervention. The importance of insurance 
regulation and supervision also is reinforced by the integration of world insurance markets, which requires an 
adequate and comparable regulatory framework in each jurisdiction. 
The literature contains different views about motivations for regulation, taking into account the need for capital 
adequacy regulation and for supervision in the insurance business. Advocates for a free insurance market without 
any regulation, supervision, or capital adequacy requirements argue that asymmetric information in insurance is 
less severe than in banking and that an insurance company crisis or failure is less costly than a bank failure. Rees 
and Kessner (1999) discuss this issue extensively, and they favor a free insurance market based on their analysis 
of the U.K. (unregulated) and German (tightly regulated) markets. They argue that because buyers are always 
ready to pay for an insurer or a reinsurer that guarantees solvency, there is always enough capital available in 
case of insolvency. Therefore, the decision of insurers is efficient in terms of economic capital, and regulation 
would impose a deadweight loss on the market. This argument rests on the assumption that consumers are fully 
informed about the insolvency risk. Klemperer and Meyer (1985), however, remove this crucial assumption that 
the consumer can understand the solvency risk fully and can use relevant information effectively. Given the 
empirical evidence, they dispute the superiority of the U.K. unregulated model and assert that insurance failures 
(citing the period 1986–99) are more severe than the losses of other financial institutions. 
Despite the arguments in favor of a free and unregulated market, in practice the regulation and supervision of the 
insurance industry are common and widespread around the world. Yet the argument for freedom from regulation 
and supervision is stronger for insurance than for banking. This is because insurers do not need to provide 
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suddenly massive liquidity (i.e., to cover rapid withdrawals by depositors, such as those that could lead to a bank 
run and spread throughout the system). In addition, the insurance business is better able to diversify its risk 
portfolio through reinsurance.  
User perceptions of regulation and supervision combine with those of capital adequacy to help shape the 
evolution and development of insurance markets. Therefore, public policy is a significant factor in strengthening 
insurance markets (especially in Latin America and the Caribbean), in identifying the limits of government 
intervention to promote the insurance business, in avoiding under provisioning and financial disruptions, and in 
assuring welfare gains (Greene 1976). By the same token, excessive and direct intervention can increase 
inefficiencies. In fact, the danger of moral hazard increases whenever the government establishes implicit or 
explicit guarantees against insolvency. The promise of bailouts removes incentives from policyholders to 
consider insurers’ financial strength when buying insurance coverage. The danger of adverse selection would 
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